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AN EXPERIMENT IN PREVENTIVE ANTI-TRUST: JUDICIAL
REGULATION OF THE MOTION PICTURE EXHIBITION
MARKET UNDER THE PARAMOUNT DECREES
I. INTRODUCTION
DURING the last decade an unnoticed series of skirmishes has taken place in
the Southern District of New York between the nation's four largest motion
picture exhibitors, their various local competitors, and the Department of
Justice. This on-going conflict has been fought within the framework of judicial
regulation of the motion picture exhibition industry under the acquisition
clauses of the Paramount decrees. The wave of new theatre construction which
has begun to sweep the country has provided the casus bclli. Boasting extra-
wide screens, multidirectional sound and specially designed accoustics, no-draft
air conditioning, ultra-modem appointments, and, above all, spacious parking
facilities, the new theatres are decisive elements in luring patrons from their
television sets and the vintage movies on the late show. This new wave of
theatre building is one of the many effects of suburban expansion. Not only
has a large segment of the theatre-going public moved to the suburbs, but so
has the merchant whose customers have forsaken him in an effort to avoid the
inconvenience of inadequate and costly downtown parking. The result has been
the well-known growth of shopping centers in the new suburban areas and the
increasing demand for entertainment facilities within easy reach of home.
These external forces pulling the motion picture industry into suburban shop-
ping centers have been matched by dynamic changes in industrial technology;
theatres that cannot play Panavision, Todd-AO or Cinemascope films, along
with their super-stereophonic sound tracks, are giving way to those that can.
The motion picture exhibitor's enthusiastic rush into new theatre construc-
tion is being led by the large national circuits. These national circuits are of
two types: those which were themselves inspired by, and owe their current
strength to, the present wave of modem theatre construction; and those which
existed prior to World War II, and, at that time, completely dominated the
national exhibition market. While all the circuits are similarly motivated, the
older ones, formerly affiliated with the national production and distribution
companies and now by virtue of the Paramount decrees separate entities, are
building with a special energy. Their theatres, the "palaces" of a by-gone era,
today the "dreadnoughts" in the industry, are typically located in the core of
the city and are woefully outdated. Moreover, they are surrounded in most in-
stances by decaying neighborhoods and frequently occupy properties which
would bring a far higher return today if used for some other commercial pur-
pose. In short, these older circuits in order to survive must follow their com-
petition and patrons to the suburbs by purchasing or constructing modern
theatres.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Enter the Paramount decrees. These, the progeny of the famous antitrust
case United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,1 stand athwart the efforts of
the "older" circuits to acquire modern facilities. Stanley Warner, successor to
the Warner Bros. theatre chain ;2 National-General, successor to the Twentieth
Century-Fox chain ;3 American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, successor
to Paramount Pictures ;4 and Loew's Theatres, successor to Loew's,5 owe their
independent existence to the Paramount litigation in which eight major motion
picture companies 6 were convicted of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.
By judicial decree, these circuits 7 were divorced from their parent companies
and ordered to divest themselves of sufficient theatres to render the exhibition
field competitive in all the major, and most of the minor, cities in the United
States.8 These divestitures were designed to introduce competition to the many
communities whose exhibition markets had been monopolized by one of the
defendant circuits. It was thought that "opening" these "closed towns" would
help destroy the base of the circuits' illegal market control, since the transfer
1. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
2. At date of trial, Warner Bros. operated 501 theatres and controlled 20 others
through joint ownership, with other defendants. CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MoIxoN
PICTURE INDUSTRY 49 (1960). Hereinafter cited as CONANT. This is the best available
single volume of historical data on the industry before, and some years after, the Parainounl
case. Today Stanley Warner operates about 207 theatres. See note 224 inlra for a general
description of theatre ownership today.
3. National-General Corp. is the successor of National Theatres, Inc., the inediate
successor of Fox. At date of trial Twentieth Century-Fox operated 636 theatres and
controlled an additional 66 jointly with other defendants. Ibid. Today National-General
controls approximately 225 theatres.
4. At trial date, Paramount operated 1,395 theatres and controlled 993 jointly. Today
American Broadcasting-Paramount controls some 413 theatres. Ibid.
5. Operated 135 theatres independently, and 21 jointly with other defendants. Today
Loew's operates about 56 theatres. Ibid.
6. Paramount, Loew's, RKO, Warner Brothers and Twentieth Century-Fox (known
in the industry as the five majors), which were vertically integrated production-distribntion-
exhibition firms; and Columbia, Universal and United Artists, the three minors, all of
which engaged in distribution. The first two also were production companies.
7. The Radio-Keith-Orpheum (RKO) operated a circuit of 109 theatres independently
of others and 187 jointly. It is not discussed in this Comment, and therefore reference
is made to "four spin-off circuits" rather than five. The RKO Circuit has not been
acquiring theatres, and presently has less than 54 theatres. See note 224 infra.
8. All the decrees were signed by a special statutory three-judge court, sitting in the
Southern District of New York; they are cited:
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 1948-49 Trade Cas. 62863 (SD.N,Y.
1948) (the RKO Decree).
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 1948-49 Trade Cas. 63009 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (the Paramount Decree).
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. 64544 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (the
Twentieth Century-Fox Decree).
The Warner Bros. Decree, 1950-51 Trade Cas. 64264 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
The Loew's Decree, 1952-53 Trade Cas. 67324 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
These will be collectively referred to as the Paramount decrees.
[Vol. 74 :10411042
MOTION PICTURE ANTI-TRUST
of market power from monopoly towns to competitive towns would thereby
be prevented. In addition, the circuits were enjoined from maintaining any
intercorporate relationship whatsoever with their former parents.0 Finally,
written into each decree, to the contents of which tile newly created circuits
were each required to consent, were provisions prohibiting them from acquiring
[A] beneficial interest in any theatre ... unless Warner's [or Loew's, or
Paramount's, etc.] exhibitor successor shall show to the satisfaction of the
Court, and the Court shall first find, that the acquisition will not unduly
restrain competition.10
These acquisitions clauses were the complementary enforcement mechanism
to the divestiture clauses; in effect, the court was directed to prevent the re-
establishment by the circuits of a monopoly position in any town. Thus, for
Stanley Warner, National-General, American Broadcasting-Paramount and
Loew's, the dash to the suburbs begins in the courtroom. Their adventures in
the Southern District of New York, the court charged with supervision of the
Paramount decrees, provide the subject matter of this Comment."
The Docket in Equity No. 87-273, United States 2'. Paramount, shows sev-
eral hundred entries since 1949 when the Southern District of New York uin-
dertook, by Supreme Court mandate, its continuing supervision over the bulk
of the motion picture industry. -1 2 As of January 31, 1963, roughly 65 of these
entries represented petitions to the court pursuant to the acquisition clauses
either to purchase existing theatres or to build new theatres. Approximately
40 million dollars of capital investment in leaseholds or fees were involved in
these petitions,' 3 representing the purchase, construction, or long-term leasing
of about 100 theatres.14
9. Decrees cited supra note 8.
10. The Warner Bros. Decree III, 6(b), supra note 8, at 64267. Similar wording ap-
pears in each decree.
11. There have been several U.S. District Judges who have presided from time to
time; but, since the late 1950's, Judge Edmund L. Palmieri has served as the judicial
czar of the industry.
12. Most of the entries involved matters of administration, although a few were
controversial and engendered substantial litigation. Only two complete lists of docket
entries are'available, one in the non-confidential files of the Department of Justice, and
the other in the Southern District of New York. The Board of Editors of the Yale Lau,
Journal is grateful to Mr. Maurice Silverman, a senior trial attorney in the Department's
Antitrust Division, for providing the author of this Comment with access to the Paramnout
docket and the extensive files which have grown up concerning it.
13. All acquisitions entries are under one of the following rubrics, United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc.; v. Loew's, Inc.; v. Warner Brothers, Inc.; v. Tventieth
Century-Fox, Inc.; RKO has not been acquiring theatres. The original Equity case
number, No. 87-273 is used to identify every petition.
14. During the last two years, circuit petitions have been filed and adjudicated at
roughly twice the pace of previous years, and, at date of publication, it may be estimated
that their total now approaches 90; that the number of theatres is over 130; and that the
capital investment involved, either planned or in being, is about $58 million. These
figures are, at best, only approximate, having been reached by averaging the known costs
of roughly 30 acquisitions and multiplying the figure so derived against total acquisitions
10431965]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The theatres to be built all had a great deal in common. All were suburban
facilities, constructed either in highly successful or very promising shopping
centers or in the midst of the local business district of a suburban community.
New drive-in facilities were customarily built on the fringes of the core city
or of the suburban communities. Sometimes, although rarely, they were built
in or near suburban business districts. In each instance, the areas concerned
were undergoing population booms which made them among the fastest grow-
ing localities in the United States. Each theatre was equipped with the most
up-to-date exhibition equipment, and, in the case of the conventionals or non-
drive-in theatres, each was specially engineered with regard to accoustics, seat-
ing arrangements and climate control. The conventional theatres were, as a
rule, of medium size, 900-1100 seats; the drive-ins varied markedly, ranging
from 850 to 1350 in car capacities. Only in special cases was a proposed theatre
significantly larger than the average size of the more important of its poten-
tial competitors. A broad generalization can be made concerning each of the
new theatres proposed: on the face of the petitions and the affidavits filed in
their support, each appeared to be an excellent investment in the economy of
booming suburban communities; each would offer the movie-going public and
the industry sorely needed modern facilities; and, lastly, each by its entry into
the existing exhibition situation in its respective town, would significantly in-
crease competition. In many instances, however, there were a group of voci-
ferous local theatre owners, euphemistically labeled amici curiae, who were of
a distinctly different persuasion, and in several significant cases, were able to
obtain the sympathies of the Department of Justice.
The petitions to purchase pre-existing theatre facilities presented a different
picture. Here the theatres were not necessarily new or well equipped, nor was
the surrounding region necessarily growing in population and commerce.15
These theatres were chiefly drive-ins,'0 acquired by the older circuits who had
minus a number of exceptional cases, such as the short-term leasing of Cinerama theatres,
The $500,000 per theatre figure so obtained may be somewhat high or low, but attorneys
for the circuits have informed the author that it is as accurate as could be obtained con-
sidering the total absence of reliable statistics. Not included in any figures given above
in text or footnote is the Stanley Warner Corporation's October 1962 acquisition, for
roughly $6.5 million of the Lone Star Circuit consisting of 37 pre-existing drive-in and
conventional facilities. See United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas.
77074 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). All acquisitions cases are heard solely in the Southern District of
New York which has exclusive jurisdiction; all citations to papers filed and to records
should be read as including (S.D.N.Y.).
15. Typical of these were the American Broadcasting-Paramount acquisitions in
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania and Fayetteville, North Carolina. See text accompanyizng
footnotes 112-23, 137-45 infra.
16. In exceptional cases, however, pre-existing conventional theatres have been ac-
quired. These have usually been part of a package including drive-ins, or can otherwise
be explained by exceptional circumstances. An excellent example is provided by Stanley
Warner's acquisition of the Lone Star Circuit in Texas. United States v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 77074 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The purpose of this acquisition
was expansion and diversification into a new state and into the drive-in market. Lone
Star Hearing Transcript, p. 9, Sept. 18, 1962.'
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never been in the drive-in business prior to the Paramount decrees, in order to
tap this rich and growing source of patronage. Some of the fiercest battles be-
tween the acquiring circuits and the amici curiae, as well as the largest number
of failures to obtain court approval, were in this group of petitions. Here the
Government seldom had to be won over by the amic; it was usually opposed
at the outset, and rarely willing to compromise.
These two groups of petitions under the Paramount decrees - the petitions
to build new-facilities, and the petitions to buy pre-existing facilities - will
provide the framework for an analysis of the District Court's administration
of the acquisition clauses of the Paramount decrees. The relevant factors util-
ized in determining whether a proposed acquisition will "unduly restrain com-
petition" will be examined; this standard will itself be evaluated; the results
will be assessed; and this unique attempt at preventive antitrust will be ex-
amined critically. Before launching on this journey, however, it will be essential
to know something about who the amid curiae are, why they are so called, and
what their role is in these proceedings.
H. T~if Aricr CuRiAE: Qum NomiNE? Quo VAuis?
The local competitors of the petitioning circuits did not gracefully accept so
meek a status as amid curiae. For several years they struggled, in a few notable
instances, for the right to intervene as full-fledged parties in interest. Arguing
that the Justice Department would not properly represent the competing thea-
tre owners' or the public's interest, these would-be intervenors cited the Gov-
ernment's refusal to undertake intensive studies of the "entire machinery used
in exhibiting and distributing," in the competitive area affected by the proposed
acquisition.' 7 Admittedly the Government never made such a survey1 s Point-
ing to the months that would be required for such detailed research, the De-
partment of Justice customarily limited its inquiry to an examination of the
petition and its supporting affidavits, local maps, and conversations with in-
terested parties.19 Another argument urged on the court was based upon the
language of Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which reads:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an ac-
tion:... (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected
17. See the Wometco Television and Theatre Co's Motion for Leave to Intervene
and Affidavit of Mitchell Wolfson, President, filed June 28, 1957. (Motion denied July
1, 1957, in the Loew's Miami Beach acquisition case.) See note 47 infra. The proceeding
was a Loew's petition to acquire a conventional theatre in Miami Beach, Florida, granted
on July 10, 1957. The language quoted appeared in the Wolfson Affidavit, p. 2. All papers
cited are on file in the Antitrust Division's Paramount Docket.
18. The author's discussions with the senior trial attorney responsible for enforce-
ment of the Paramount decrees, substantiated the amicus' point. The eplanation is that
such an investigation would be costly in time and manpower and is thought unnecessary
by the Department. Moreover, the decree provisions on acquisitions are supervised by
only one man, and it would be physically impossible for him to do more than rely on the
affidavits of the parties, maps, and discussions and correspondence with competing theatre
owners.
19. See note 18 supra.
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by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody
or subject to the control or disposition of the court .... 20
It was also asserted that the acquisitions clauses of the Paramount decrees
contemplated a full adversary hearing to inform the judge; else, how could he
"first find," as the clauses require, "that the acquisition will not unduly restrain
competition"? Only the would-be intervenor supposedly had the interest in
bringing forth the requisite evidence of the petitioning circuit's illegal trade
practices and proclivities to restrain competition. Finally, the local competitors
customarily argued that leave to appear as amici curiae was an inadequate
substitute for intervention, for only the intervenor had power to subpoena and
adduce evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal. 1
Despite their superficial appeal, the arguments of the local competitors were
roundly rejected. 22
A major difficulty with allowing intervention in the proceedings under the
acquisition clauses is inherent in the nature of the issues which the would-be
intervenors wanted to litigate. Where the petitioning circuit had another thea-
tre anywhere in the surrounding area, it was customarily charged that this
theatre had obtained favored treatment from the distributor with which it was
formerly affiliated and from the other distributor defendants in the Paramount
case; that it was obtaining films without bidding, or despite bids lower than
those its competitors made; and that it was obtaining a preferred run or better
clearances 2 than it deserved, all to the detriment of the complainant. The
complainant wanted to intervene to prove these charges, using discovery pro-
ceedings, taking depositions, and trying all the issues of fact. Where the peti-
tioning circuit had no such theatre in the immediate area, these allegations were
still raised, albeit hypothetically, or in the guise of visiting the petitioner with
the sins of its former parent, a defendant in Paramount.
Excellent illustration of the protracted litigation which such intervention
would engender is provided by the proceedings surrounding the petition of the
20. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a).
21. See, e.g., the argument made by the petitioning circuit's local competitors at tile
hearing on the Stanley Warner Corporation's Cheltenham acquisition, Oct. 14, 1960,
Transcript pp. 12-13; see text accompanying notes 67-85 infra. See also the court's view
of the amici's rights as non-litigants. Transcript pp. 54, 71.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ; Chelten.
ham Transcript, supra note 21, pp. 14-15.
23. A clearance is the period of time, usually stipulated in license contracts, which
must elapse between runs of the same feature within a particular area or in specified
theatres.
Runs are successive exhibitions of a feature in a given area, first-run being tile
first exhibition in that area, second-run being the next subsequent, and so on, and
include successive exhibitions in different theatres, even though such theatres may
be under common ownership or management.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 144 n. 6 (1948). A preferred run
is a first or a first neighborhood run, as the case may be, or simply an earlier run than a
similarly situated competitor. A better clearance is merely a longer period of time. Clear-
ances are usually measured in weeks; thus there are seven-day, 14-day, and 28-day
clearances.
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Loew's Circuit to build a conventional theatre facility in Miami Beach, in
June of 1957.24 The Wometco Television & Theatre Co., the area's largest
exhibitor (23 theatres in Greater Miami) ,25 sought to intervene, pressing all
the arguments for intervention already mentioned. It had failed to convince
the justice Department in previous conferences, and consequently desired to
try its case before the District Court. Loew's had only one other theatre
in South Florida, the Riviera, constructed over the anguished protest of the
Wometco Circuit two years before 26 in a successful shopping center in Coral
Gables, one of the fastest growing suburban towns in America. Prior to con-
struction of the Riviera, no "neighborhood" theatre in Greater Miami had
ever played first-run Miami; rather the distributors had permitted neighbor-
hood theatres to exhibit feature films only after they had been shown for a
given period in the downtown houses. The Riviera, however, from the time it
opened, played nothing but first run.? Disregarding the theatre's modern facil-
ities, its spacious parking facilities and its ideal location across the street from
the University of Miami, Wometco charged that the Riviera's great first-run
success was the result of blatant discriminations and restraints of trade. It as-
serted that if Loew's were allowed to build a like facility in the northern por-
tion of Miami Beach, approximately 24 miles away, it would similarly obtain
discriminatory advantages and restrain competition. Vometco demanded leave
to intervene, arguing that an intervenor's subpoena power was essential to
obtain the evidence to prove
that it [Loew's] has used its "long purse" in bidding at the Riviera
Theatre in the manner which the Supreme Court sought to avoid.., and
also to prove that the Riviera is not one bit better either in performance
or potential than several Greater Miami neighborhood theatres except that
it bears the name Loew's, and that such theatres have not been allowed to
obtain first-run pictures.28
Loew's, of course, denied everything, and charged Wometco with seeking only
to delay the disposition of the application. The Loew's affidavits charged, more-
over, not only that the Riviera had been required to bid competitively for
product, having been shown no favoritism at any time, but that the Wometco
chain
24. The only opinion in this case which was reported is that denying intervention,
cited infra note 30. All the data concerning the case has been extrapolated from the pe-
titions and records of the procedings examined in the non-confidential files in the Paramount
case at the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. The Loew's petition is dated
June 11, 1957. The court granted it on July 10, 1957.
25. This figure comes from the papers filed in an earlier Loew's proceeding to
acquire a conventional theatre in Coral Gables, Florida, dated Aug. 29, 1955 and also
from the Loew's affidavit filed on July 11, 1957. Today, the ,Vometco circuit has roughly
the same number of theatres in the Greater Miami area. Fm. DAmy Yr'.nnoo op Mornol
PicTUREs 1083 (1964). Wometco's closest competitors, Florida State Theatres, a subsidiary
of American Broadcasting-Paramount, had 12, and Claughton Circuit had seven in the area.
26. This is the August, 1955, proceeding mentioned in the preceding note.
27. See Wometco's affidavit of June 28, 1957, p. 3.
28. Id. pp. 6-7.
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has been favored because of its dominant position and buying power in
the area. Wometco has on numerous occasions obtained product without
bidding competitively, all to the detriment of the Riviera.. 29
The issue was joined, and surely had the District Court permitted interven-
tion, a private antitrust suit would have ensued with all the trimmings except
the customary demands for treble damages.
The District Court refused to countenance such a prospect,80 in large part
because of the ever-present danger that every acquisition petition under the
decrees could easily turn into a private antitrust suit of unlimited dimensions,
It had acted similarly in every prior case, and has done so since. In some of
these cases 31 the court has relied upon another argument which makes clear
that no status other than that of amicus curiae can be available to the compet-
ing theatre owners. Without a clause in the final Paramount decree retaining
jurisdiction over the original parties and the cause of action, the final decrees
would close the record, ending the litigation and exhausting the court's juris-
diction. 2 On the other hand, where the decree specifically provides for con-
tinuing jurisdiction, the court may grant additional relief, modify its prior
orders, or entertain any action directly related to the original cause, as if the
case were still open.33 This judicial power, however, is subject to one over-
riding qualification. As Judge Sugarman explained in denying a motion to in-
tervene in an earlier Loew's acquisition proceeding, "when retained,... (con-
tinuing jurisdiction] will be exercised within the limitations of that reten-
tion."'3 4 Since the retained jurisdiction was limited in the decree to the original
parties,3 5 the court is without power to subject Loew's, American Broadcast-
29. See Loew's Affidavit, dated July 11, 1957, p. 2.
30. The opinion is not reported. Wometco appealed to the Supreme Court from the
District Court's denial of its motion to intervene. See Wometco Television & Theatre Co.
v. United States, 355 U.S. 40 (1957) affirming per curiam.
31. The court's views were previously set forth in other opinions, most notably in
United States v. Loew's, Inc. 20 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) and United States v. Loew's,
Inc. 136 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Its attitude is also reflected in the cases most
often cited by the court to support a denial of intervention, for example, United States
v. A.S.C.A.P., 11 F.R.D. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), and has been expressed from the bench.
See, e.g., the Cheltenham Transcript, mipra note 21, pp. 12-14.
32. United States v. Loew's, Inc. 136 F. Supp. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ; Buckeye
Coal & Ry. Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co. 269 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1925).
33. United States v. Loew's supra note 32.
34. Ibid.
35. The decrees all contained the following clause which seems to have been spe-
cifically designed to bar intervention by third parties:
Jurisdiction of this cause is retained for the purpose of enabling any of the parties
and their successors to this consent judgment, and no others, to apply to the Court
at any time for such orders or direction as may be necessary or appropriate for
the construction, modification or carrying out of the same, for the enforcement of
compliance therewith, and for the punishment of violations thereof, or for other
or further relief. (Emphasis added).
The Warner Bros. Decree, XI(b), supra note 8, at 64275.
[Vol. 74: 10411048
MOTION PICTURE ANTI-TRUST
ing-Paramount, Stanley Warner, or National-General, the successors in in-
terest to the Paramount defendants, to the subpoenas and examination of any
third parties (here the competing theatre owners) every time the petitioning
circuits seek court approval to build or buy a new theatre. Only the Govern-
ment as the original plaintiff has such rights. To everyone else the Paramount
case must be considered closed, and intervention therefore unavailablePe
Whether or not the Justice Department would properly represent the public
interest is irrelevant. Should the petitioner's alleged behavior violate the anti-
trust laws to the detriment of the would-be intervenors, their remedy, if the
Government refuses to prosecute, is an original private suit under the Sherman
Act for treble damages.37
The issue of intervention in circuit acquisition proceedings vas settled in the
Loew's Miami Beach petition case; the court's denial of Wometco's motion to
intervene was affirmed per curiarn by a unanimous Supreme Court. s The is-
sue still arises on occasion, but the District Court now denies such motions
from the bench. 39 Neighboring theatre owners desirous of protesting a pro-
posed acquisition are heard only at the sufferance of the court, and only then
as amid curiae, with all the theoretical disabilities 4 0 of that lesser status.
36. This rule has an ancient and honorable antecedent, United States v. Northern
Sec. Co, 128 F. 808, 810 (C.C.S.D. Minn. 1904). The case being closed .ith the only
exceptions being those provided for in the decree, intervention by right under Rule 24a(3)
of the Fed. IL Civ. P. must be foreclosed. The court never addressed itself specifically
to the applicability of this rule; but it has dealt with the arguments for permissive in-
tervention urder Rule 24(b). See note 31 supra and accompanying text. See also United
States v. Loew's, 20 FILD. 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
37. See United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, 10 F.R.D. 73, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y.
1949). Adherence to the position taken in the text does not require the concession that
competing theatre owners either could or would better represent the public interest. In
the first place, their primary interest is in preventing the construction of a new competing
theatre or the entry into their local market of a large national circuit by purchase of a
pre-existing facility. Increased competition is just what they least desire. This is best
illustrated by the saga of amicus Bailey, in Stanley 'Warner's Hamden case, discussed
at text accompanying notes 91-105 infra. And see note 203 infra. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has rejected the proposition that the private businessman can protect the public
interest in a public antitrust suit where the Government is present but does not choose to
support the private individual's claim. See Buckeye Coal & Ry. Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry.
Co., 269 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1925). The court's primary concern is that the public's interest
may be lost in the shuffle if private parties are allowed to intervene and threaten the
Government's control of the proceedings. See United States v. Loew's, Inc. 20 F.R.D.
423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). For reasons very similar to those given herein, intervention in
the Paramount case itself was consistently denied. See Ball, Trustee v. United States, 338
U.S. 802 (1949); Partmar Corp. v. United States, 338 U.S. 804 (1949); United States
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 177 (1948) ; Sutphen Estates, Inc., v. United States,
342 U.S. 19 (1951).
38. Wometco Television & Theatre Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 40 (1957) (per
curtam).
39. See Cheltenham Transcript, supra note 21, pp. 14, 20.
40. See text accompanying notes 185-86 infra.
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III. REPRESENTATIVE CASES: AN ILLUSIVE QUEST FOR ELUSIVE
COMPETITION
Since acquisition petitions filed pursuant to the Paramount decrees are heard
in equity,41 the court has the power not only to grant or deny the petition, but
also to grant it with conditions or restrictions attached. While the court has
exercised its broad power in differing ways in numerous cases, the results can
be descriptively classified under five major headings: (1) the petition is grant-
ed without restriction; (2) the petition is granted with some form of continu-
ing judicial supervision over the operation of the new theatre; (3) the petition
is granted, but the circuit's operation of other theatres in the same market is
restricted; (4) the petition is granted, but the new theatre is subjected to
product restrictions; and (5) the petition is denied.
The petition is granted without restriction
The Loew's Raritan Township petition 42 was notable chiefly for the spirited
contest waged against it by the amicus Keyport Theatre Company. Loew's
sought permission to build a relatively small drive-in, in which it would own a
one-half interest, on Route 35, ten miles south of Perth Amboy, New Jersey,
Keyport Theatre Co. which operated a drive-in 3.5 miles from the proposed
site, unsuccessfully sought to intervene, and then filed as amicus claiming that
it would be adversely affected by the new theatre. Without the new theatre
Keyport would have a near monopoly of the drive-in trade in the immediate
area. The two closest competing drive-ins were 13.5 and 14.5 miles from the
site of the proposed theatre. These were owned by Reade, a local circuit which
dominated exhibition in this entire area of New Jersey and owned the only
two first-run conventional houses in Perth Amboy, ten miles to the north; all
six conventional houses in Asbury Park, 24 miles to the south; the one first-
run conventional house in Red Bank, 7.5 miles south; and others scattered in
the smaller towns in the intervening areas. The Reade Circuit did not appear
as an amicus or otherwise show any interest in the proceedings. The papers
filed indicate considerable discussion over the relative distances between the
amicus, the proposed theatre, and the other competing theatres in the Perth
Amboy-Asbury Park-Red Bank area; the relative size of the competing thea-
tres and the absolute size of the theatre-going population; and the present
film distribution patterns in the area. The last received most emphasis.
On this point, Keyport argued that Loew's would be able to acquire for its
drive-in theatre first-run product unavailable at that time to other drive-ins in
41. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 334 U.S. 131 (1948) was brought In
equity under Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958), for injunctions and other equitable
remedies.
42. The opinion allowing this acquisition is unreported; thus, all citations are to
the papers filed with the court. The petition was filed November 15, 1955. Ieyport Theatre
Company's Motion to Intervene was made on November 23, 1955, and its supporting affi-
davits were filed on that date. All data given may be found in either of these two docu-
ments on file with the Department of Justice; separate citations will not be made.
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the area. Its proof, offered in affidavits, consisted of a showing that the other
one-half interest in the proposed drive-in was in a son-in-law of the New Jer-
sey distribution chief for Columbia Pictures, distributor of about 15 per cent
of the total available product, and of an allegation that Loew's was a persistent
antitrust violator and could be expected to use its considerable market power
to coerce distributors to grant it a first-run position. After considering these
arguments, as well as the factors mentioned above, the court permitted the
acquisition with no restrictions. It relied heavily on the Government's refusal
to oppose the application, and on the view that "The opportunity for antitrust
violation standing by itself, does not constitute an adequate basis upon which
to conclude such a violation." 43 Furthermore, the court said, it could always
inquire into the fact situation which may later arise, should the new theatre in-
deed obtain first-run product when no other drive-in exhibitor was able to
do so.
The result in this case is not atypical. In two other situations, for example,
the Loew's circuit was permitted to acquire without restriction two theatres
in the Greater Miami area, both times over the anguished cries of the local
exhibition giant, the Wometco Circuit. The first, in 1955, involved the con-
struction of the Riviera Theatre in Coral Gables. 44 At that time, Loew's owned
only one other theatre in the state, approximately 375 miles to the north in
Jacksonville. Competition for product among exhibitors in the Greater Miami
area was intense. The Wometco Circuit (23 theatres), the Florida State Cir-
cuit (12 theatres), and the Claughton Circuit (7 theatres), controlled all but
two of the first-run houses in the entire area, a population center of roughly
a million people. The distribution of product was on a competitive bidding
basis, with downtown Miami, downtown Coral Gables, and downtown Miami
Beach, playing the same first-run picture at the same time for the same period
- called "day and dating" in the industry. In this situation, it is understand-
able that the court gave short shrift to Wometco's arguments that competition
would be "unduly restrained" should Loew's be permitted to enter the market.
In fact, with day and dating the modus vivendi, Loew's single house was at a
distinct disadvantage, since Florida State, Wometco and Claughton had two
or more houses for which to bid, all quite large and with prime locations. In-
dustry practice across the country indicates that multiple first-runs, that is day-
and-dating in various locations, are usually played in theatres owned by the
same circuits. The explanation lies in the economies of group advertising. Local
theatre owners, moreover, are reluctant to show films simultaneously with com-
petitors, since it is easy for a competing house to take a free ride on advertis-
ing toward the cost of which it did not contribute; and the distributors gen-
43. On this point, the court cited Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co,
225 F2d 289,294 (2d Cir. 1955).
44. The opinion herein is unreported. Loew's Theatres & Realty Co. filed its petition
on Aug. 29, 1955 which was subsequently granted. All data have been derived from the
papers filed, and from interviews with local theatre operators who requested that their
names be withheld.
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erally respect this reluctance. 45 This situation apparently prevailed in Greater
Miami, and the result was that because Loew's Riviera was usually forced to
play first-run by itself, it lost much high quality product which the distributors
preferred to open on multiple first-run in commonly owned theatres.40
Two years later, Loew's filed its petition 47 to build another conventional
facility 24 miles northeast of the Riviera Theatre, at the other pole of the
Greater Miami exhibition market. The site was ideal in every way. Like the
Riviera site, it was located in a flourishing shopping center with abundant park-
ing facilities and in the midst of an area experiencing booming commercial and
population growth. The immediate locale was greatly under-served by theatre
facilities. The closest competition was a medium size drive-in, 3.3 miles away,
operated by Wometco. The only other significant competitors were 8-10 miles
south in central Miami Beach and 7-8 miles north in central Fort Lauderdale.
Since arguing that competition would be unduly restrained was at least as far-
fetched in this instance as it was in the Riviera petition, Wometco, appearing
as amicus curiae,48 contended instead that Loew's was guilty of anti-competi-
tive practices. It asserted that the Riviera's first-run position was the result of
collusion between Loew's and the distributors, and that the latter had broken
their long-standing policy of requiring all Greater Miami first-run exhibition
to be confined to the downtown areas of Miami, -Miami Beach, and Coral
Gables, thus discriminating against all other exhibitors in favor of Loew's.
Wometco argued that the distributors' action was unjustified because 'the
Riviera is not one bit better either in performance, or potential than several
Greater Miami neighborhood houses... . 9 While the alleged distribution pat-
tern existed in fact, there was no evidence in the record that it was the result
45. Such considerations have begun to undermine the theatre-by-theatre buying and
selling injunctions of the Paramount decrees. Although bids are offered and received
for individual houses, it becomes obvious from a casual reading of local theatre listings
in New York City, for example, that multiple runs are played mostly on a circuit or
chain basis. This has consistently been true in Miami where Wometco's Carib, Miami,
and Miracle Theatres always play day-and-date. Regardless of the way in which bidding
or negotiating is in fact accomplished the effect is clear; in areas where multiple runs
are common, a single-theatre operator is at a real disadvantage.
46. There were numerous exceptional instances; the Loew's Riviera day-and-dated
occasionally with one of Florida State's theatres or with one or more of the Claughton
Circuit's houses, sometimes, too, with one of the very few independent houses in the area.
There is no evidence that Loew's Riviera ever played day-and-date with any of Womet-
co's theatres. This additional information was obtained from August, 1964 interviews
with theatre operators in the Miami area, who have requested to remain anonymous,
47. Loew's Theatres and Realty Co., filed its petition in the Southern District In
June, 1957. Wometco's papers seeking intervention were filed on June 28, 1957. The
intervention was denied on July 1, 1957, and the petition was granted on July 10, 1957
The opinion and order are unreported. All data has been derived from these papers, on
file with the Department of Justice, and from interviews with theatre operators in Miami,
who have requested that their names be withheld.
48. See discussion of Wometco's attempt to intervene, in text accompanying notes
25-30, .=pra.
49. See notes 27 & 28, msipra.
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of a deliberate, unjustified discrimination against the dominant Wometco,
Florida State and Claughton chains, merely to benefit Loew's single theatre. °
Indeed, for a distributor to discriminate against South Florida's largest ex-
hibitors in favor of its smallest would appear to be irrational. Thus, once again
over Wometco's protests, Loew's acquisition petition was granted without re-
striction.51
The petition is granted swith some form of continuing judidal supervision ovcr
the operation of the new theatre
The Stanley Warner Corporation's La Mirada, California, petition r - is the
most prominent in this category. Stanley Warner sought to build a new con-
ventional theatre in a shopping center in the town of La Mirada, a suburb of
Los Angeles. Population growth had been phenomenal, soaring from 5,000 in
1920 to 22,500 in 1960, when the town was incorporated. This growth was
not atypical; 380,000 people lived within a five mile radius of the site, a 200
per cent increase in ten years. La Mirada had no conventional theatre and only
one drive-in, about 2.5 miles from the proposed site. Fourteen drive-ins and
34 conventional houses, a total of 48 competitors were located within a 13 mile
radius.
There were several active and vociferous amici in this case, who convinced
the Department of Justice and the court that there were too many theatres
already servicing the area, and that the new theatre could, and very well might,
drive some of the existing theatres out of business, especially if economic ex-
pansion and population growth in the area tapered off. Accordidgly the court's
decree retained sufficient supervision to prevent such a "grave possibility":
This grave possibility impels me to pause. The resolution of the problem
depends, in the last analysis, upon the course of future population and
business trends in the area... It is likely that most of the theatres will
continue to operate and it is likely that this rapidly developing area will
continue to grow. But I prefer to defer a definitive decision because of the
unusual facts here presented. I have accordingly inserted the following
provision in the order I am filing herewith:
"ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the petitioner,
.... may acquire the New Theatre, provided that within sixty (60)
days after the first fifteen (15) months of operation it submits to this
50. In fact, the evidence seems to have been very much to the contrary. See text
following note 27, stpra.
51. Today, the Loew's Riviera and 170th Street Theatres, as the most recent theatre
is called, play day-and-date on almost every occasion, drawing their patrons from within
a 12-mile radius of each theatre. They are highly successful, and, in the opinion of several
observers, their presence had made a considerable contribution to a genuine competitive
atmosphere in the Greater Miami exhibition market.
52. United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1961 Trade Cas. 78480 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (hereinafter cited as La Mirada). The petition was filed in late July, 1961, and
the hearing was held on Aug. 16, 1961. The data in the te.x-t came from the petition, from
the supporting and contesting papers filed in the Southern District of Nevw York, and
from the hearing transcript. All papers are on file in the Antitrust Division in the
Paramount Docket.
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court appropriate proof that the operation of said theatre on a first-
run basis has not constituted an undue restraint of trade. Such proof
shall include a sworn statement of the nature and extent of moving
picture exhibition conducted within a 13 mile radius of the proposed
site, at the end of said fifteen (15) month period."
* * * Its right to continue its proposed theatre on a first-run basis will
abide the submission of the proof required by the order filed herewith.5 3
A careful examination of the transcript of the hearing and all supporting
papers filed does indeed turn up "unusual facts"; but, they are facts which
make it a great deal less than pellucid how this new theatre could possibly
"unduly restrain competition." Of the 48 theatres serving this area, 35 played
multiple first-run. Of the remaining 13 theatres, six played Mexican, nudist,
or strictly foreign product, and seven played permanently on subsequent run.
Since the La Mirada would be a first-run theatre, and since first and subse-
quent run houses are not traditionally considered in the same market,64 the 35
first-run houses alone should have been the proper objects of concern. None of
the 35 were by any means weak sisters. Nine multi-theatre companies owned
all 35 :5 the National Theatres Circuit with 250 theatres, operated six; the
Pacific Drive-in Corp., then a 43-theatre chain, operated 14; amicus Stein,
then a 28-theatre operation, owned three; amicus Electro Vision Corp., then
a 14-theatre chain, operated one; Sterling Theatres Co., a 32-theatre chain,
owned one ;56 amicus Vinnicof, then operating seven, owned four; amicus Bruin
operated three; and amicus Cummings, a five-theatre concern, operated two.
Stanley Warner, the petitioner, already owned one. Since there was no pattern
of exclusive first runs, with any one theatre obtaining a clearance over all of
its competitors, it was probable that Stanley Warner's La Mirada would be
compelled to play day-and-date with other theatres on a multiple first run. In
this posture, it was unlikely that the new theatre would deprive existing thea-
tres of much product.5 7 In addition, given the large number of threatres in the
area, any loss of patrons probably would be spread over many box offices.
53. Id. at 74481. (Emphasis added).
54. But see complete discussion infra note 166.
55. Included in this figure are drive-ins playing multiple first and second runs, the
consensus being that for a great part of the year in this market, drive-ins and con-
ventionals were directly competitive.
56. This theatre, the La Mirada Drive-in, was listed in the papers filed by the parties
in the name of one M. A. Appleman; but the Sterling Company, a Seattle-based operation,
is in fact the owner. See Fi, DAILY YEARBOOK OF MOTION PIcruRns 1076 (1964).
57. The explanation for this statement is that each theatre playing on a multiple
run, that is, playing the same film day-and-date with other houses, is by definition lo-
cated in such a geographic position that it is only minimally competitive for the same
patrons as the other theatres with which it plays day-and-date. If this were not true,
there would be no reason to play the same film at more than one theatre. Hence, each
multiple first-run zone is a local sub-market unto itself, and it is presumed that compe-
tition to show product in that geographic sub-market will only be between theatres
located in it. At the time that Stanley Warner filed its petition, the town of La Mirada,
the probable multiple first-run submarket, had no conventional theatre and only a small
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The five amid united in protest and filed joint affidavits repeating the same
arguments. These were of two related kinds. The first was too many theatres
and too little product:
By any rule of thumb, whether it be population vs. theatres, or popu-
lation vs. number of theatre seats, the La Mirada area is supersaturated
with theatres and has an over-abundance of theatre seats. This means that
the theatres in the La Mirada area are competing with each other on a
very vigorous basis. This is particularly true because of the shortage of
film product, which is a situation well known to all in the industry....
[T]he La Habra Theatre, for the past several years,... has just barely
remained in the black. The profit we earned was nominal and in no way
justifies the very substantial investment which we have in the theatre. If
Stanley Warner builds the La Mirada Theatre, which is only 2y miles
from La Habra, it will only make our economic plight more precarious.53
Second, Stanley Warner will have an overwhelming advantage in obtaining
the little product available:
The fact that Warner Brothers [sic: Stanley Warner] at the moment
operate only six theatres in the state of California is not important, but the
fact that [it] still operates approximately 250 theatres on a national basis,
almost all of these theatres being theatres of size and stature located in
principal cities, is important. The fact that they do maintain principal
offices in New York City where the heads of the film distributing com-
panies are located, and the fact that they maintain highly paid large staffs
in New York City and are able to use their vast buying power and bring
to bear pressure and influence, also is important and places the independ-
ent exhibitor, who has none of these advantages in a secondary and most
unfavorable competitive position.5 9
With regard to the validity of these arguments, it must suffice at this point
merely to say that the first directly conflicts with the purpose of the acquisitions
clauses of the Paramount decrees - to foster a fiercely competitive exhibition
market throughout the United States; and the second would simply penalize
bigness and geographical location of main offices without any evidence of il-
legality in either and without any rational connection to the promotion of com-
petition. Nevertheless, both points had peculiar effectiveness in the La Mirada
case, as the opinion excerpted above indicates.
The result of the case is especially difficult to justify in light of the "unusual
facts here presented," to use the court's phrase, which destroyed the amici's
position. Amicus Vinnicof had just completed construction of a new theatre in
the same area five months before; amicus Stein had, at about the time of the
La Mirada hearing, announced plans to construct a new facility also in the
same area, and amicus Electro Vision had just then announced plans to build
drive-in 2.5 miles away. Thus, the new theatre, if it played on multiple run, was unlikely
to deprive any theatres of very much product since its competition to obtain the multiple-
run was so limited. Certainly it would not very seriously affect all or most of the existing
35 theatres within the 13-mile radius fixed by the court.
58. Karp affidavit on behalf of Electro Vision Corporation (amicus curiae), p. 2, dated
Aug. 31, 1961, La Mirada.
59. Stein affidavit, (amicus curiae), p. 2, dated Aug. 30, 1961, id.
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a $750,000 theatre, not only in the same competitive area, but also within 2.5
miles of its own existing La Habra Theatre which it was lamenting that Stan-
ley Warner's La Mirada would ruin.' ° Moreover, a make-believe atmosphere
fell over the whole proceeding when it was proved by Stanley Warner that
the General Drive-in Corp., one of the nation's most successful "independent"0 1
chains, was prepared and in fact had agreed with the owners of the La Mirada
Shopping Center to pick up Stanley Warner's option to build, without further
negotiations, should the court deny Stanley Warner permission to construct
the theatre.62 Despite the fact that these events had been called to its attention,
the court, supported by the Department of Justice, feared for the health of
competition in exhibition in the La Mirada area and found it necessary to
provide for continuing judicial supervision. Although the order was scrupulous-
ly followed, the report filed by Stanley Warner pursuant to it 03 leaves no doubt
of the futility of the whole exercise. Since the La Mirada Theatre opened, the
area continued to grow, adding 300,000 additional persons. The amici curiae
in total disregard of their fears about too many theatres and too little product,
continued to build and add theatres to their circuits. Moreover, no theatre
existing when the La Mirada opened had gone out of business.
Another form of continuing supervision, taking a somewhat more prophy-
lactic approach to antitrust law enforcement, is the "thou shalt not" decree with
penalty attached if "thou shalt." There are several decrees of this type presently
outstanding. The Loew's petition to purchase the Normandy Drive-in 0 4 is
characteristic. In this instance, Loew's was permitted to buy from a single in-
dependent exhibitor a 1350 car-capacity drive-in in Jacksonville, Florida. The
theatre was on subsequent run, 21 days after first run Jacksonville. Since all of
Jacksonville's 18 conventional and 11 drive-in theatres were considered within
the relevant market, the area looked substantially competitive. Despite this
situation, the court, without articulating its reasons, allowed the purchase, but
with restrictions providing the existing competitors with a protective and
supervisory decree:
60. The data as to the construction activity of the amid curiae is given in the
Schwartz & Frohlich letter to the court, dated Sept. 23, 1961, pp. 3-4, and in the affidavit
of Simon Fabian, President of Stanley Warner Corp., dated Sept 18, 1961, pp. 3 and
3n 1, 15, 19 and Exhibits B and B-1, id.
61. The descriptive adjective "independent" is frequently used by the court and tte
parties to denote any theatre operator not formerly affiliated with a Paramount defendant.
It is a misleading appellation. See note 77, infra.
62. Affidavit of Simon Fabian, President of Stanley Warner Corp., supra note 54
and Exhibit C, id, and copies of correspondence between General Drive-in (now General
Cinema Corp.) and the shopping center management attached thereto.
63. Affidavit of Harry M. Kalmine, Vice President and General Manager of Stanley
Warner Corp., dated April 20, 1964, and filed on that date in the Southern District of
New York, and in the Antitrust Division of the Department of justice.
64. Loew's petition was dated May 20, 1955, and was granted on June 2, 1955. No
report of the opinion and order is available; the records of the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice were used and all data comes therefrom.
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If, during a period of three years from the date of the acquisition of the
Normandy ... by petitioner, an independent operator in substantial com-
petition with the Normandy... is not afforded a reasonable opportunity
to procure films for such theatre on the availability afforded the Normandy
.. if he so desires, then the Normandy Outdoor Theatre, if it continues
operation on a run of 21 days after 1st run or earlier (but other than first
run) shall be subjected to a product limitation as hereinafter set forth.05
Added to the decree was the provision that if the court should decide, or the
parties agree, that the condition stated above has occurred, then for the suc-
ceeding three years the Normandy shall not license more than 60 per cent of
the feature films released by the eight major distributors.60 There is no avail-
able evidence to indicate whether this clause has ever been invoked.
The petition is granted, but the circuit's operation of other theatres in the same
mrket is restricted
The Stanley Warner Corporation's Cheltenham petition 07 was the occasion
for a pitched battle between the dominant exhibitor interests in the Cheltenham
area of Philadelphia and a petitioning circuit which had been suffering a con-
tinuous decline in its ability to compete for top quality product in the Phila-
delphia market. The theatre to be constructed by Stanley Warner vas to cost
roughly $500,000 and to have 1200 seats and the most modem facilities and
design currently available. Population had increased considerably in this out-
lying district of Philadelphia, and the site was in an immense, ideally located
and highly successful shopping center with an estimated draw of approximately
1 million customers from metropolitan Philadelphia. The amid curiae were the
operators of the two closest theatres: the Ellis Circuit - the second largest
chain (21 theatres) in the Philadelphia area 0 8 - operating the Erlen, at that
time the sole theatre on key, or first-neighborhood, run; and Mr. Melvin
Koff, owner of the Keswick Theatre. The key run in this clearance zone had
an availability of 21-28 days after downtown Philadelphia. The petitioner,
Stanley Warner, also operated in the Cheltenham area the YorktovM Theatre
(820 seats) and the Lane Theatre, a strictly art and foreign product house.
For some time, the Cheltenham section of Philadelphia had been noncom-
petitive. The Erlen (Ellis) and the Yorktown (Stanley Warner) had split all
available product along distributor lines, each playing e-xclusively the product
65. Order, dated June 2, 1955, id.
66. This 60% of major product limitation is the arbitrary percentage limitation
chosen by the 3-judge court, which wrote the Paramount decrees, for purposes of giving
"independent theatres a crack at quality product." See the Warner Bros. Decree, supra
note 8, V(1) n. 4.
67. The petition was dated Sept. 26, 1960; the Ellis Circuit's motion for leave to
intervene and supporting papers were dated October 8, 1960; and the court's opinion and
order were dated November 22 and 23, 1960, respectively. The opinion alone is reported,
United States v. Warner Bros., 1960 Trade Cas. 77397 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (hereinafter cite,
as Cheltenham).
68. Affidavit of Frank J. Damis, Vice President and Philadelphia Zone Manager,
Stanley Warner Corp., dated Nov. 2, 1960, p. 10.
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of one or more distributors.P9 The Keswick (Koff), slightly further north, in
Glenside, played the product of all the distributors, without bidding against the
Erlen or the Yorktown, often playing day-and-date with either. At some point,
probably at about the time the Ellis Circuit renovated the Erlen, a bidding
situation developed due to Ellis' refusal to continue the split 70 with the York-
town. The two houses, no more than 1.8 miles apart, could not profitably play
day-and-date with each other. The Erlen, with 1600 seats was about twice as
large as, and better appointed than, the Yorktown. According to the testimony
of Stanley Warner's zone manager,
We [Stanley Warner] got our brains knocked out. We bid against the
Eren with 800 seats against 1600. Even though our Yorktown... is. .
very nice, the Erlen ... is a real beautiful theatre with lots of seats, and
we couldn't compete.
Q. He was outbidding you, is that correct?
A. Sometimes we bid.., and it would cost us 90 per cent of the gross,
and I think in one instance it cost 100 per cent of the gross. . . . We
couldn't afford to take these losses, so we . . . decided not to bid any
more.
71
Thereafter, the Erlen and the Keswick were the sole key run houses in the
area. Stanley Warner fell back to subsequent neighborhood run, behind the
Erlen.7 2
Since Cheltenham Township was a highly promising market and the new
shopping center an ideal site, Stanley Warner saw an opportunity to re-enter
the key run competition by constructing a new facility. At all times, Stanley
Warner made clear its intention to compete with the Erlen, as well as with the
Keswick, and on cross examination at the hearing Stanley Warner's zone man-
ager testified that he anticipated a bidding situation would develop against both
the Erlen and the Keswick.73 Since the new theatre with its immense parking
facilities (space for 4400 cars), 74 was expected to draw on the patronage of
the full half-million people living within a five mile radius of the shopping
center, and since Stanley Warner intended to request exclusive key run on the
product for which it would bid, with clearance over both Erlen and Keswick,
all three theatres would be in "substantial competition" for the same patron-
age.75
As would be expected, the catalog of arguments advanced by the amici Ellis
and Koff, illustrated the entire gamut of contentions put forward from the first
69. Cheltenham hearing Transcript, pp. 70-72, Oct. 14, 1960.
70. "Split," when used as a noun, is a term of art referring to a division of film
product either along distributor lines as in the Cheltenham area or as explained ilfra,
notes 236-242 and accompanying text. No judgment vill be made at any point in this
Comment on the legality of this form of market division under the antitrust law, For
its incidence in the national exhibition market, see note 133 infra.
71. Cheltenham hearing Transcript, p. 74.
72. Id. p. 75.
73. Id. pp. 87, 90, 95-96, 97.
74. Stanley Warner's Memorandum on the Facts, dated Nov. 4, 1960, p. 8,
75. See note 73 supra.
1058 [Vol. 74:1041
MOTION PICTURE ANTI-TRUST
acquisition petition to date. Present, with varying degrees of evidentiary sup-
port, were the following: overall population may be increasing, but theatre-
going population has fallen off; there was a severe shortage of quality box-
office product, especially of the type appealing to this kind of neighborhood;
this particular key run clearance zone had sufficient theatres to fill the demand,
the emergence of the Erlen as the sole key run theatre in Cheltenham demon-
strating the zone's inability to support more than one such theatre; for these
reasons no economic justification for the new theatre existed, and therefore
Stanley Warner's purpose in building the new theatre must be to drive Messrs.
Ellis and Koff out of business by using its superior resources to procure the
bulk of the better product. 7 6 The most serious difficulty with the last argument,
and thus a fortiori with the three points preceding it, was that Smith Manage-
ment now the General Cinema Corp., one of the nation's leading and most dy-
namic "independent circuits," 77 was at the time of the hearing negotiating with
the Cheltenham Shopping Center management to erect a theatre on the same
site should Stanley Warner's present plans go astray.78 Surely this fact was
better evidence of the genuine need and the commercial justification for a new
theatre than the victory of the Erlen over the puny Yorktown was to the con-
trary. For General Cinema would hardly be willing to sink $500,000 in an
unprofitable theatre in the impossible hope of obtaining a monopoly by driving
the Erlen out of business and by simultaneously preventing entry by other
competitors, even were it initially to be conceded that Stanley Warner would
be so foolish. Apparently, however, the fact that the amid fortified their argu-
ments with loud and repetitious assertions of the probability of anticompetitive
practices was sufficient to convince the Court that the amid's arguments were
credible despite their evident dubiety.
Seeing which way the wind was blowing, Stanley Warner fought hard, tak-
ing issue with each point, and emphasizing in particular that the new theatre
would create two key run houses in the Erlen's clearance zone, and would thus
conform to the general pattern in the Philadelphia area. The fact vwas that the
majority of key run zones of similar composition contained two or more key
run theatres ;79 dearly the Erlen had no vested right in a key run free from
76. Mr. Ellis' language, on p. 10 of his affidavit, is quoted in the reply affidavit of
Frank J. Damis, Vice President and Zone Manager for Stanley Warner, mipra note 63,
pp. 2,9.
77. Though commonly called "independents," circuits like General Cinema are no
more independent than Stanley Warner or Loew's; the appellation is misleading. It
originated in pre-Paramount days when there were only two types of theatres, those
affiliated with the defendant producer-distributor-exhibitors, and those which were not.
Today, the appellation "independent" continues to arise in case after case, see, e.g., note
61 supra, and accompanying text, although it is now meaningless. As the District Court
itself has said: "These theatre companies [the spin-off circuits] are no less 'independent
circuits' ... than the many substantial companies not subject to the decree with whom
petitioner is in competition all over the country." Lone Star Circuit opinion, 77077.
The appellation "independent" should be quietly interred.
78. Stanley Warner's Memorandum on the Facts, p. 9.
79. Damis Affidavit, id. p. 13.
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any substantial competition. The decisive factor in the court's decision in favor
of the construction, however, was the Government's lengthy memorandum find-
ing substantial business justification for the investment, and arguing what was
later to be repudiated in the La Mirada case -that "a circuit has every right
to compete for whatever patronage there is in an area whether it be declining,
rising, or static .... "30 On the other hand, the Department of Justice agreed
with the amid that there was indeed "a shortage of quality... and significant
box office pictures," a situation which justified restrictions on Stanley Warners'
ability to compete overall in the Cheltenham area.81 In brief, the restrictions
which were suggested and later written into its decree by the court, were
designed to insure that Stanley Warner would be unable to operate "any more
key run theatres in the area than any one of its present competitors...82 and
to this end the decree permanently enjoined the petitioner from operating its
Yorktown or Lane Theatres on key run as long as the Ellis Circuit operated
only one key run house in the Cheltenham area.83
80. Memorandum on Motions to Intervene and on the Memoranda and Affidavits of
Amid Curiae, filed by the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, p. 4 Nov. 6, 1960.
81. Id. p. 7; see the discussion concerning this alleged product shortage, and
criticism thereof, as a justification for competitive restrictions, notes 208-14 infra, and
accompanying text.
82. Id. p. 10.
83. Ibid. The text of the Cheltenham Order follows. It will be referred to frequently
in subsequent sections of this Comment, and may profitably be compared with the HIamden
Order, see text at note 101 infra.
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Petitioner, STAN=Y
WARNER CoaroPATioN may acquire the New Theatre, and it is further ordered:
1. That so long as Petitioner operates the New Theatre on a first neighborhood
run policy, Petitioner shall not exhibit on first neighborhood run at its Yorktown
Theatre ... and/or its Lane Theatre... any feature picture [exclusive of foreign
language pictures and British films] distributed by the defendant distributors in
Equity Case Number 87-273, except as to
(a) any such feature picture for which competitors who have had an oppor-
tunity to request licenses on first neighborhood run have not made an offer or have
made an insubstantial offer, but nothing contained in this subparagraph shall be
deemed to authorize the playing of any such feature picture at the Yorktown
Theatre on first neighborhood run day and date with both the New Theatre and
a competitor of the Yorktovn Theatre, or
(b) any such feature picture exhibited at a competitive theatre on first
neighborhood run with respect to which the operator of such or any other com-
competitive first neighborhood run theatre has not requested clearance or priority
of run over the Yorktown Theatre or the Lane Theatre, which such picture may
be played at the theatre over which clearance or priority of run has not been
requested; or
(c) any such feature picture exhibited at the Renel Theatre [owned by
the amicu=s Ellis Circuit] on first neighborhood rim, when the operator of the Renel
Theatre is also operating the Erlen Theatre on a policy of playing such pictures
on first neighborhood run, which such pictures may be played at the Yorktovn...
or Lane, ... but not both.
2. The provisions of paragraph I shall cease to apply in the event that the
operator of the Rend Theatre in Philadelphia,... [the Ellis Circuit] shall operate
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On the whole, the Cheltenham order is not unusual and has parallels in
other situations. Most commonly, however, the restrictions are slightly less
extreme, and the acquiring circuit is enjoined only from playing day-and-date,
new theatre with old, from "averaging off" bids between its houses, or from
playing its own move-overs 84 in its older houses, unless its competitors had a
chance to bid for the subsequent run.as
Another important aspect of the acquisitions clauses was unwittingly re-
vealed by the Government's memorandum to the court in the Cheltcnham case.
The conclusion of the memorandum demonstrated the Department of Justice's
failure to appreciate that its suggested order would restrict the ability of the
petitioner to operate according to the policies dictated by its independent busi-
ness judgment. The Department stated:
The Government does not believe the issue to be how many theatres or
how many key run theatres this competitive area needs or should have.
This is a business judgment to be made by Stanley Warner,80 just as it
would be made by any exhibitor not subject to a judgment who proposed
to enter into this area with a new theatre which it was proposed to operate
on the key run.1
This statement is impossible to reconcile with the Government's proposal, later
adopted by the court, which prevented Stanley Warner from operating another
theatre on key run regardless of the number of such houses which business in
the area warranted. Even worse, Stanley Warner's business judgment was
made dependent upon that of its leading competitor, for the order stipulated
that the petitioner could only move another theatre up to key run if the amicus
Ellis had done so first.ss Whether or not the ChlItenham order had a beneficial
effect on competition, the Government was taking part in a process by which
it and the court were performing a function directly analogous to that per-
formed by a regulatory commission issuing a conditioned certificate of public
the Renel ... on a policy of playing pictures released by the defendant distributors
on first neighborhood run, when such operator is also operating the Erlen Theatre
on such policy; but in no event shall Petitioner at any one time operate more than
two of the New Theatre, the Yorktown Theatre and the Lane Theatre on first
neighborhood run.
Cheltenhaa Order, dated Nov. 22, 1960, filed Nov. 23, 1960, in the Southern District
of New York (unreported). It was also provided that if the petitioner should operate
the New Theatre on a first run Philadelphia basis, the Yorktown may not be similiarly
operated. Ibid.
84. A move-over from first or any other run is a continuation of that run of a picture
in a second theatre.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 76373, 76376. (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (San Jose, Calif.) (hereinafter cited as San Jose); and see the provisions of the
Hamden Order, note 101 infra, and accompanying text.
86. Loew's, National-General or American Broadcasting-Paramount may be freely
substituted, and the reader could place this paragraph in any one of a dozen Government
memoranda or hearing transcripts in an equal number of acquisition cases.
87. Memorandum, supra note 80, at 11.
88. Cheltenham Order, subpara. 1(c), and para. 2, supra note 83.
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convenience and necessity. Nor is Cheltenham atypical. To date, the acquisi-
tions clauses of the Paramount decrees have been read as invitations for the
Government and the court to substitute their judgment for that of the market
place as to how many theatres should be operating.89 Indeed, their performance
in many cases is reminiscent of that of the CAB which has often limited entry
into certain markets in the airlines industry in order to preserve the market
positions and investment of existing carriers. 90
The petition is granted but the new theatre is subjected to product restrictions
In this category Stanley Warner's Hamden, Connecticut, petition 91 is the
paradigm case of the logical extreme. Stanley Warner sought to acquire a con-
ventional shopping center theatre in suburban Hamden, on the fringe of the
New Haven metropolitan area. There were 13 existing conventional theatres
in this metropolitan area, four of which played first run on a permanent basis,
and there were also four drive-ins on subsequent run. The first-run market
was only minimally competitive. The three downtown New Haven houses,
Loew's College, Stanley Warner's Roger Sherman, and American Broadcast-
ing-Paramount Theatres' Paramount, "split" or allocated the first run product
of the major distributors among themselves without bidding competitively for
it.9 2 The Whalley Theatre, a semi-neighborhood house, owned by the amicus
Mr. Bailey, a local multi-theatre operator, successfully bid from time to time
against whichever downtown house would otherwise have obtained the particu-
lar picture.9 3 Most of the time, however, the Whalley negotiated directly for
product without bidding, and usually played extended-run road show attrac-
tions. Amicus Bailey owned the most theatres in the New Haven area,94 operat-
ing in addition to the Whalley two neighborhood theatres of somewhat ancient
vintage, both playing first-run day-and-date with each other, usually with less
than top quality product. He also had interests in the sole New Haven art and
foreign product theatre, the Lincoln, a very small and poorly appointed estab-
lishment. In addition, Bailey owned the fee of the Crown, the only downtown
theatre specializing in unusual films, typically of good quality, on their last and
final runs. The entire New Haven area was treated by all parties as the appro-
priate competitive market, and although there was some discussion of the dis-
89. See, e.g., The La Mirada case, where the court was concerned that there were
too many theatres in the competitive area, discussed in text supra at notes 52-53.
90. See, e.g., Southern Service to the West Case, 12 C.A.B. 518 (1951), in which
the C.A.B. denied additional entry into transcontinental routes across the southern United
States because such entry would divert business from and decrease the revenues of ex-
isting carriers. Id. at 524-32, passim.
91. United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1961 Trade Cas. 78290. Order filed
June 28, 1961 (order unreported) (hereinafter cited as Hamden). All the data given In
the text comes from various papers filed and the hearing transcript.
92. See discussion of the "split," .spra, note 70, and infra notes 236-42.
93. Handen hearing Transcript, June 1, 1961, p. 13.
94. The data on Bailey's holdings and interests comes from the Stanley Warner
Petition, pp. 6-7, filed in the Southern District of New York on March 20, 1961.
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tances between the competing houses and the proposed new theatre, it was
apparent from the outset that all theatres were considered within one large
first-run clearance zone. The resulting disturbance of the existing distribution
pattern by the entry of new competition was a possibility which neither the
amicus, the Department of Justice, nor the court was willing to permit.
At the urging of the amicus Bailey, the Government took the position that
the acquisition should only be permitted if Mr. Bailey's Whalley Theatre could
be protected. The Whalley was a 942 seat house about 1.4 miles from the down-
town theatre district. It was more than 20 years old and had been renovated
from time to time, but was unable to show the newest-technique wide screen
films.95 As compared to the proposed new theatre in terms of its ability to serve
the movie-going public and the distributors who hoped to maximize their re-
turn on each film released, the Whalley was decidedly at a well-merited dis-
advantage. The new theatre was to have 1150 seats and to be located in the
midst of a very large shopping center with parking facilities for over 1500 cars.
It would be the first theatre constructed in Greater New Haven since World
War II, and thus be the only one to possess the requisite equipment to exhibit
"every presently known one-strip process, including 70mm, Todd AO, Pana-
vision, Cinemascope" as well as the standard 35mm pictures. 0 The theatre also
would be far more attractive than the Whalley and much better appointed. It
was to be designed with every modem theatre development: no-draft air-condi-
tioning, specially engineered accoustics, and special speakers to provide "super
stereophonic sound never heard before in [the] area."07 In every way it would
be an ideal first-run house, well suited to road-show use, and especially well
qualified to exhibit the most recent developments in modem motion picture
entertainment. As such, it would be a strong competitive force, and a threat
to the market position of all existing theatres in Greater New Haven. The
Whalley, however, was considered by the Government and the court to be the
key to the public interest in the "preservation of competition"; and, at the cost
of rendering the new theatre unable to exhibit the first-run product for which
it was designed, the Whalley was to be preserved. The Government's argument
cannot be paraphrased without losing its flavor:
Stanley Warner does presently operate one of the four theatres in New
Haven which are first run... playing primarily the first-run releases of
the seven major distributors .... If the new theatre becomes a first run
theatre of this kind, it means that it will be superimposed upon a first run
position that Stanley Warner already has in the New Haven area. Be-
cause of the way product is offered for licensing in New Haven... if
conventional first run product is siphoned away by the new theatre from
any of the competing first run theatres, it is likely to be the Whalley from
which it is siphoned. If this should eliminate the Whalley as a first run
95. Ibid. The Whalley's inability to show all the latest wide screen product accounts
for the restrictive provision in subparagraph (b) of the Hamden Order, text at note
101 infra.
96. Id. pp. 5-6.
97. Ibid.
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theatre, it, of course, would inean the elimination of a competitor and give
Stanley Warner two of the four first run theatres in the New Haven area
instead of one of the four as at present. The net result would be an en-
hancement of Stanley Warner's first run position and a corresponding
diminution of its first run competition. Any such result, in the view of the
Government would mean that competition will have been unduly restrain-
ed. Accordingly, the Government has suggested restrictions on the opera-
tion of the new theatre, calculated to assure that the impact of the new
theatre will not be to deprive the Whalley of the first-run product of the
seven major distributors .... 98
Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the public interest in com-
petition can be, or is, safeguarded by preserving competitors, the above ration-
ale is not very convincing. In the first place, if the new theatre were to siphon
product away from anyone, it would probably be first from the existing mem-
bers of the split, and then from the Whalley. Initially, the members of the split,
Stanley Warner, American Broadcasting-Paramount, and Loew's could be
expected to rearrange the existing market division, and this could only be done
by each one giving up some product which it formerly would have obtained
to the new theatre. In the past the Whalley had been highly successful in
bidding "across the split" and taking pictures away from the Paramount, the
Loew's College and the Roger Sherman ;09 since the split would presumably
continue with the new theatre's participation, the Whalley would not be forced
to bid head-on against the new theatre for every film it wanted. 10° And in bid-
ding against the other theatres in town, no reason was advanced why it should
automatically be less successful after the construction of the new theatre by
Stanley Warner. In any event, some evidence should have been required as to
whether, should the many competitive advantages of the new theatre truly be
overwhelming, the amount of product the Whalley would lose would indeed
put it out of the first-run market, or simply render it somewhat less profitable.
Whereas concern for the continued existence of the Whalley may be relevant to
those who see the antitrust law as a means of protecting existing entrepreneurs
from extinction by more efficient and attractive competitors, concern for in-
suring existing levels of profit is entirely unfounded for it makes the antitrust
law a means of providing a guaranteed annual income for businessmen.
Such bothersome questions never arose, however, and the competitive re-
strictions written into the decree effectively rendered the new theatre a subse-
quent run house by severely restricting its access to first-run product. The
resulting order represents the logical extreme of a decade of effort to trans-
form the acquisitions clauses of the Paramount decrees into instruments for
insulating existing local theatre owners from the forces of change sweeping the
industry. The major operative clause of the Hamden order read as follows:
98. Memorandum on the Position of the Government, Department of Justice, p. 3,
dated June 12, 1961.
99. Note 93 .ipra.
100. This is because the whole concept of the split would require that the new
theatre remove itself from the market for many films,
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1. So long as Petitioner operates the Roger Sherman Theatre in New
Haven, Connecticut, on a first run policy, Petitioner shall not exhibit at
the New Theatre on first run feature motion pictures released by the major
distributors of motion pictures except as follows:
(a) During any three month period commencing January 1, April 1,
July 1 and October 1 of any year feature motion pictures released by the
major distributors may be shown on first run at the New Theatre for a
period of time corresponding to the aggregate period of time feature mo-
tion pictures, released by the major distributors, have been shown on first
run at the Whalley, Westville, and Whitney Theatres during the preceding
three calendar months, less fifteen weeks.
(b) There may be shown, in addition to the pictures which may be
shown pursuant to the preceding subparagraph, such pictures released by
the major distributors on first run for which independent competitors who
have had an opportunity to request licenses on first run have not made an
offer or have made an insubstantial offer. Independent competitors shall
not be deemed to have had an opportunity to request licenses within the
meaning of this subparagraph when a major distributor offers a picture,
which will be released in 35mm and 70mm or other wide screen process,
for licensing for its first run New Haven showing only in 70 mm or such
other wide screen process.10 '
Subparagraph (a) is complex and requires some explanation. In brief, the
Whalley would require 13 weeks of first-run product per quarter to operate
continually as a first-run house. The order guaranteed Mr. Bailey that Stanley
Warner's new theatre would not be able to operate on first-run unless he ob-
tained sufficient product for 15 weeks of first-run for all three of his theatres.
Obviously, he could use no more than 13 at the Whalley, and therefore had
two extra weeks of first-run for the Whitney and the Westville Theatres before
he would be faced with any first-run competition from the new theatre. In
practice, the order was completely unworkable. 0 2 Stanley Warner could do no
planning at all until the number of weeks Bailey played first run were known,
and these were always subject to change until the last moment, depending upon
the profitability of the particular movies booked in that quarter. Thus each
given three month period had to end before Stanley Warner could know how
many first run films it could bid on for the next three months. However, once
the previous three months had expired, the product for the next quarter of
the year had already been booked by the distributors into other first-run houses
including Bailey's. As Stanley Warner's losses began to mount and it prepared
to return to court for modification of the order, Bailey relented and agreed to
101. The Hamden Order, dated June 27, 1961, filed June 28th, pp. 2-3. There were
other clauses of the decree which prevented the new theatre from playing move-over
runs from, or playing day-and-date with, Stanley Varner's other first-run house, the
Roger Sherman, unless in the previous three months amicus Bailey's three theatres had
played move-overs or day-and-date; and, then, such move-overs (defined in note 84
supra) and day-and-dating were permissible only for an equivalent time.
102. Telephone Interview with Mr. Stuart H. Aarons of the Office of the General
Attorney, Stanley Warner Corp., on Feb. 5, 1965.
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enter a major product split covering all Greater New Haven's first run houses.
The New Haven first-run market is now totally non-competitive with the exist-
ing market division frozen, and effectively maintained by the court's decree.
Both Bailey and Stanley Warner have every incentive to make the current
split work: the former gets better product than he might otherwise obtain in
a bidding situation ;103 and the latter is released from a severely restricted posi-
tion into which it may again be thrust if the split should break down.
Subparagraph (b) is self explanatory, although its effects prior to the recent
split require brief elaboration. The new theatre, being the only one capable of
showing 70 mm film, would have been able, without the restriction in subpara-
graph (a), to obtain all wide-screen films offered by the distributors to the
New Haven market. Subparagraph, (b), while permitting the new theatre to
show 70 mm films where no substantial bid had been made for the film by one
of its competitors, severely limited this concession by requiring that all films
offered to the New Haven market be made available in both 70 and 35mm.104
With top quality product, it was unlikely that the first-run New Haven movie-
goer would ever see 70mm or other wide screen processes for his money unless
the requirements of subparagraph (a) were met permitting Stanley Warner to
bid for such product. As a consequence, the New Haven moviegoer, by virtue
of the decree, would likely have been deprived of the most exciting visual
achievements of recent motion picture technology.105
103. This aspect of the New Haven "split" is unusual; ordinarily no competitor gets
better product - rather, he gets the same product more cheaply. See text accompanyhig
notes 239-40 infra.
104. Subparagraph (b) of the order, text at note 101, supra, does not, of course,
require in ipsissimis verbis that the distributors offer all film in 70mm and 35imm In
Greater New Haven. However, subparagraph (b) excludes wide-screen film product, which
is not also offered in 35 mm, from those films which the new theatre can show free of
the restrictions in subparagraph (a).
If a film is offered only in 70mm, and if the conditions in subparagraph (a) allowing
the new theatre to play first run have not occurred, then the new theatre cannot play
that 70mm film; consequently, that film will not be shown in New Haven, no theatre
other than the new one being equipped to show it. For this reason, the distributors, prior
to the recent split between the Whalley and the new theatre, were, in effect rcquired
to offer all product in 35mm as well as 70mm, as if the new theatre did not exist.
105. In certain instances, this is still the case today; but, in general, because of the
Greater New Haven product split, to which Bailey finally agreed, Stanley Warner's new
theatre gets a good deal of wide-screen product. A recent example is the contest which
developed over the "Sound of Music," which was released by Twentieth Century-Fox In
both 70mm and 35mm. Since the Whalley was tied up for a long "road show" of "My
Fair Lady," Bailey bid for the Whitney Theatre, a much older, 895 seat house capable
of showing 35mm alone. He made a "substantial offer" and invoked the Hamden Order,
subparagraph (b), and Fox was prepared to adhere to it. Had Bailey not been moved by
Stanley Warner's pleas that he adhere to the agreed split, which would have given the film
to Stanley Warner's new theatre, the public would have been forced to see the "Sound of
Music' on its first-run in 35 mm, a much narrower screen than 70mm, and to hear its
musical score over less modem musical facilities than those available in the new theatre.
Interview with attorneys for Stanley Warner Corp., April 9, 1965, New York City.
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The petition is denied
One of the first cases to fall within this category was National Theatres'
(the spin-off circuit of Twentieth Century-Fox) Garden Grove, California
petition.' °6 Garden Grove, in Orange County about 25 miles from Los Angeles
and about one mile from Disneyland, was the fastest growing community in
the United States in 1957, the year of the petition. At the time of the petition,
Garden Grove had only one theatre, a thirty-year old house about 1.75 miles
from the proposed site with a seating capacity of 410. The Vinnicof Circuit,
the most vociferous of the protesting amici, was at that very moment building
a 1000 seat conventional theatre in the town. Despite the phenomenal growth
of the area, only three theatres had been constructed in the entire county since
1945, the new Vinnicof theatre and two older houses, one 8.5 and the 4.6 miles
from Garden Grove. Twenty theatres, including the new Vinnicof theatre and
seven drive-ins, were within a ten-mile radius with an estimated population of
506,374. Of the 20 theatres, National operated four, the closest of which was
2.5 miles from the proposed site. With the exception of the three theatres built
since World War II, all the existing conventional houses were out-moded and
deficient in parking facilities. Three of National's four houses in Orange
County were among the worst in both of these respects, being 36, 35 and 30
years old respectively and all unable to exhibit the latest wide-screen pictures.
The fourth National theatre was 12 years old, but had been built before the
new exhibition technology had come into use. As a result, these theatres were
becoming less able to wage effective competition, and National was having in-
creasing difficulty obtaining quality product. Three of its theatres were already
on subsequent run while the fate of the fourth was in doubt. Moreover, the
great potentialities of the area made it likely that the Vinnicof chain would not
be alone in seizing such excellent exhibition opportunities by building modem
capacity. Others, such as Pacific Drive-in or General Drive-in, for example,
could be expected to follow suit, and their entry would probably have elimini-
nated National's last first-run foothold. These were the reasons underlying
National's desire to construct an ultra-modem 1000 seat conventional theatre
with parking facilities for 500 cars. These were also the reasons why National
argued that it could not possibly "unduly restrain competition" by its proposed
construction.
The Government, while it was not opposed, still did "not feel that it could
recommend National's petition."' 07 The amici, not surprisingly, were very
much opposed. They argued that the new theatre would give National enough
106. Petition dated June 11, 1957; court's opinion and order of July 26, 1957, is
unreported. However, the opinion said only that petitioner had not sustained its burden
of proof that competition would not be unduly restrained. All the data and arguments
which follow in the text have been extracted from the petition and affidavits as filed
by the parties. These papers are collected in the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice in its copy of the Paramount Docket.
107. This was the statement of the Government's trial attorney at the hearing. It
is quoted in National's Brief in Support of Motion for Reargument, Aug. 7, 1957, pp. 5-6.
19651 1067
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
leverage to dominate the first-run market, placing them at a competitive dis-
advantage; that-quality product was already too short to service adequately all
existing first-run houses in the area; and that National had engaged in anti-
competitive practices such as pooling its purchasing power and bidding from
its "long pocketbook."
As to the possibility that it would dominate the first run market, National
replied that something more than a bare assertion was necessary, since, with
the new acquisition, it would have one of four first run theatres within a five-
mile radius, hardly a preponderance by any calculation. This argument should
have been especially convincing, since day-and-dating on multiple first runs
was very common in this area. 08 Moreover, National urged the court to con-
sider the fact that the local competitors were all strong and well-managed and
that drive-in competition against conventional houses was especially fierce in
Orange County. As National pointed out, three large modern drive-ins capable
of serving 10,000 persons were operated within a ten-mile radius of the site
by one of the strongest competitive chains in the West, Pacific Drive-in Corp.;
and the amici's assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, these drive-ins
catered in large part to the same clientele.109 As a final, broader-gauge rebut-
tal of the amici's charge of dominant position, National pointed to the strong
first-run competition in the entire Los Angeles market offered by the Pacific
Drive-in Corp. Its large demand for product to fuel its 35 other drive-ins and
three conventional houses in the Greater Los Angeles metropolitan area al-
legedly gave it a favored position with distributors which National could never
hope to surmount fully. As to its alleged anticompetitive practices, National
relied heavily on the Paramount decrees' requirement that distributors license
films theatre-by-theatre and film-by-film, thus making circuit buying and other
antitrust violations based on the pooling of purchasing power unlikely. Such
an argument had been successfully made in other similar cases, in some in-
108. This means that no one theatre had exclusive first-run, with clearance over all
the rest. Moreover, the presence of multiple runs, with their concomitant day-and-dating
between houses, indicates the existence of several sub-markets rather than one major
geographic market. See note 57 supra. Thus the number of theatres a circuit possessed
would give a misleading picture of market share since all the theatres are not in the same
submarket. See note 57 sispra; and accompanying text. For the validity of the technique
of isolating submarkets, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962).
In any event, as this Comment demonstrates in a subsequent section, see text following
note 174 infra, the entire technique of measuring market share by aggregating a circult's
theatres in a geographic market and finding the percentage which this total bears to all
theatres in that market, is unreliable and erroneous.
109. The question of how competitive the drive-ins were in the Los Angeles area
was dose; and from the appearance of the record no one would seem to have obtained
the upper hand. The competitiveness of drive-ins is difficult to assess, since local climate,
daily weather conditions, and many other intangibles are inextricably interwoven. But
industry consensus seems to be that, in climates where seasons change (unlike Los Angeles
and Miami), the drive-in is a formidable competitor in summer time.
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stances by the court itself,"z0 and it is reasonable to assume that it received
judicial acceptance in this case.
Nevertheless, one or more of the amii's contentions were apparently suffi-
cient to carry the day, since the Garden Grove case closed with National suffer-
ing the most notable defeat on record with regard to petitions to construct new
theatre facilities. Regrettably, the court was content to render an opinion de-
void of explanation; the above arguments, which have been culled from the
affidavits and briefs of the parties, provide the only clues to what transpired."'
In the category of petitions to buy pre-existing facilities, American Broad-
casting-Paramount Theatres has the dubious distinction of having suffered the
most surprising losses. The latest of these was its Midway Drive-in petition U
in Jenkins Township, just Qutside the limits of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
Midway, an independently owned theatre, was one of 22 theatres, and the
smallest of 11 drive-ins in the Wilkes-Barre area. American Broadcasting-
Paramount already owned two conventional houses, one the leading first-run
theatre, and now wanted to enter the drive-in market. Petitioner's "foremost
competitor,""13 the Comerford Circuit, with five theatres, was the largest ex-
hibitor in the area. The other 15 local theatres were "independently" n 4 owned.
The Government opposed the petition, and three competing theatre owners
appeared as amici curiae, in protest.
The court mentioned five factors which it considered of importance to its
decision that the petitioner had not "sustained its burden of showing that
competition will not be unduly restrained.""5 First, the economy of Wilkes-
Barre, based on coal-mining and railroad installations, was "in the throes of
an economic slump of some duration. As a consequence, all the theatre owners
110. An excellent example of the Court's impatience with arguments from the
Government or amid curiae which presume that the circuits will abuse their purchasing
power and violate the antitrust laws in found in the Lone Star Circuit acquisition opinion,
United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas 77074 (SD).N.Y. 1962),
which, while five years subsequent to Garden Grove, merely restates a view which the
court had expressed from the bench in many prior proceedings.
111. On Aug. 7, 1957, National Theatres filed a motion for re-argument which gives
its assessment of the court's result:
9. Undue weight appears to have been attached to objectants' fears that the con-
struction of a theatre by petitioner in Garden Grove vould put them at a com-
petitive disadvantage.
10. Undue weight appears to have been attached to the desires of the new Vinnicof
theatre to be protected from competition.
Brief for Reargument4 pp. 4-5. The reargument was denied.
112. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 1962 Trade Cas. 77101 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (hereinafter referred to as Wilkes-Barre).
113. This is the court's appelation. Ibid. Comerford today operates 42 theatres in
two states, Pennsylvania and New York. Fru DAImY YAw oox or Morio:r PxcunEs
1047 (1964).
114. This adverb is the court's, but it is difficult to say what the court meant. See
notes 61 & 77 mpra.
115. Wilkes-Barre Opinion.
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have been experiencing operating difficulties."" 0 Second, with the addition of
the Midway Drive-in, petitioner's seating capacity would rise to 16.68 per cent
of the total in the area,
a greater percentage than that held by American-Paramount when the
[Paramount] Consent Judgment was entered, although the market has
substantially declined since the date of that judgment."1
Third, combined seating capacity,118 petitioner's plus the Comerford Circuit's,
would be 50.3 per cent after the purchase. Fourth, "another independent com-
petitor of these two chains is eliminated."" 19 Fifth, the purchase of this drive-in
would enable petitioner to dominate the drive-in market in the Wilkes-Barre
area:
[P]etitioner, through the Midway acquisition would place itself in a
position to outbid other drive-ins for first-run pictures, thereby protecting
its theatre in downtown Wilkes-Barre from drive-in competition.120
Although all of these arguments contain flaws, the fifth and last deserves
immediate attention because its unquestioned acceptance is so well illustrated
in the context of this case. Its use as one of the bases of decision presupposes
that the court accepted the validity of several highly questionable premises.
First, to conclude that American Broadcasting-Paramount's ownership of the
Midway Drive-in would enable that drive-in to outbid all its drive-in com-
petitors for quality product, the court must have assumed that all American
Broadcasting-Paramount's competitors, due to some peculiar disadvantage each
possessed vis-a-vis American Broadcasting-Paramount and no one else, would
be unable to offer the distributors similar inducements to obtain first-run prod-
uct, with regard to either or both the desirability and attractiveness of their
facilities and the dollar amounts of their bids.12' Second, in order to conclude
that the purchased drive-in, assuming arguendo that it could obtain a monopoly
of quality first-run product, would enable the petitioner to protect its down-
town conventional house from drive-in competition, the court must have as-
sumed that such protection was within the realm of economic feasibility. This
last assumption is untenable. In obtaining its first-run monopoly by out-bidding
all drive-in competitors for best quality product, the petitioner could not avoid
adversely affecting its downtown house, thereby incurring a double cost. Then,
to protect its downtown house, petitioner would have to shift its drive-in to
subsequent run or to low quality product, in order to permit its downtown
house to play first-run without drive-in competition. Simultaneously, the peti-
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid. This combined capacity figure is a very unusual aspect of the Wilkes-Barre
case and has no analogue in any other acquisition case.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. This is an assumption which is particularly untenable since the Midway Drive-in
was the smallest and far from the nicest in the area. Moreover, it was so located that
there was no room for expansion. Interview with Haliburton Fales, II, rEsq., Attorney
for American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres in the Wilkes-Barre case, April 9, 1965.
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tioner would somehow have to prevent the other 10 drive-ins from re-entering
the first-run film market. None but the most irrational businessman would ever
set out on so futile an endeavor.'* Another interpretation of the court's fifth
argument is possible, but it, too, demands irrational conduct on the part of the
petitioner. The court might have thought that the drive-in, after achieving its
monopoly of first-run product, would retain it, and play day-and-date with the
petitioner's downtown theatre. However, since the "protection" argument pro-
ceeds from the premise that all the drive-ins and the downtown houses are com-
petitive for the same patrons (in the warmer seasons), were the petitioner to
day-and-date its drive-in and downtown theatres, it would merely create com-
petition with itself. Petitioner would thus be no better off in terms of "pro-
tecting" its downtown conventional theatre than if the drive-in had remained
in a competitor's hands.'m In any event, the principles from which the court's
premises are derived and the data on which they presumably rest, are nowhere
stated in any judicial opinion or economic study in this field.
A consideration of two petitions simultaneously filed and denied by the court,
roughly a year before the Wilkes-Barre case, further illustrates the peculiar
characteristics of petitions dealing with pre-existing theatres. The two cases in-
volved the purchase of two theatres, one in Poughkeepsie, New York, and one
in Fayetteville, North Carolina.m  In the Poughkeepsie case the Government,
joined by an amicus curiae, was firmly opposed to the acquisition. The court's
122. The only time when it is conceivable that a drive-in facility can protect a down-
town conventional theatre is found in those situations where the drive-in in question is
the only drive-in in the relevant competitive area. In such a case, the circuit plays sub-
sequent-run or low quality first-run product exclusively in its drive-in, thus making
a smaller profit at the drive-in but protecting its conventional house - and all others
in the area, for that matter - from meaningful drive-in competition. In Wilkes-Barre
there were 11 drive-ins, and it is impossible to see how such protective action, or any
other, would work.
123. The only rebuttal to this reasoning is the argument that the drive-in and con-
ventional downtown theatres do not play to the same patrons, and thus woud not be in
competition. But if such were the case, the drive-in could not in any event either
"protect" or competitively injure the conventional downtown house.
If it is asked why the petitioner could not adequately "protect" his downtown theatre
by merely insisting on an exclusive first-run, with adequate clearance for every film it
licenses, the answer is that this approach, too, would likely fail In the first place, it is
common practice of most distributors in popular drive-in areas to offer product during
the simmer only for day-and-date showing, drive-ins with downtown conventionals. In
such a case, a downtown operator cannot demand and pay for an exclusive run, since
he is not given an opportunity. Secondly, in many areas where the distributor does not
demand day-and-dating by conventionals with drive-ins, the latter operators usually offer
to play day-and-date, and the resulting profits available to the distributors could not
be equalled by any single conventional exhibitor bidding for an exclusive run, no matter
how much he might offer.
124. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1961 Trade Cas. 78724 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). Both petitions were denied in the same opinion, but after separate discussions,
which will hereafter be referred to as the Poughkeepsie opinion or the Fayetteville I
opinion, respectively.
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opinion set forth reasons for denial similar to those advanced in Garden Grove
and Wilkes-Barre: that the acquisition would "constitute a significant rise in
petitioner's seating capacity in the competitive area," thus giving American
Broadcasting-Paramount a "more dominant position" ;125 that petitioner would
have "a position of even greater dominance from the standpoint of first-run
capacity" ;126 and that a potential independent competitor, who had just com-
pleted building the theatre sought to be purchased, would be eliminated.
None of these arguments, however, were decisive. The case appears to have
gone off on the point that petitioner had engaged in anticompetitive prac-
tices.127 The court put it this way:
The petition is presented against a factual background which indicates
that the exhibition of first-run pictures in this area has not been charac-
terized by vigorous competition.F28
Since the leading exhibitors in the area were obtaining product generally in
accord with an agreed split, the court was undoubtedly correct in this re-
gard.129 Nevertheless, for two related reasons, this finding cannot be taken
literally as the ratio decidendi. First, acquisition petitions have been approved
in situations where split of product existed. 8 0 Second, were such a finding
to result in each instance where competitive bidding had been eliminated by a
"splitting" device, it would seem to follow that such market divisions are to be
treated as presumptively illegal - a conclusion which the courts have continu-
ally refused to draw. 81 The "factual background" of the case, however, was
unusual, and for this reason may provide insight into the court's otherwise
unarticulated rationale for decision.
Prior to the Paramount decree, Poughkeepsie was a closed town on first-
run; petitioner's predecessor, Paramount Pictures, Inc., operated all three first-
run houses. The decree required petitioner, upon its creation, to divest itself of
one of them; and not long after doing so, or perhaps at the same time, Ameri-
can Broadcasting-Paramount and its divestee agreed to split product and thus
effectively to eliminate competitive bidding. The Government maintained, in
fact, that the agreement also eliminated all competition and thus rendered the
125. The Poughkeepsie opinion 78724.
126. Ibid.
127. Interview with Mr. Maurice Silverman, Attorney, Department of Justice, Anti-
trust Division, June 15, 1964, Washington, D.C.
128. The Poughkeepsie opinion 76725.
129. If, however, the Court meant to say that the "split" was evidence of the exist-
ence of non-competitive theatres, this implication would be erroneous. See text accompany-
ing notes 236-42, infra.
130. The Cheltenham and Hamden cases, discussed in text accompanying notes 67
& 91, supra, are examples, as is United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 76373,
76374-376 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 130, and the list of cases cited
by the court therein at 76374. See also, Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 320 F.2d 285, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1963), af'd b y an equally divided Court, 378 U.S.
123 (1964), rehearing denied, 85 S.Ct. 15 (1964).
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divestiture itself futile, since petitioner virtually retained its monopoly position
in the market. The protesting amicus even went so far as to assert that
American Broadcasting-Paramount still controlled all three first-run theatres.
In the Government's papers there were also intimations that some kind of tie
existed between petitioner and its divestee rendering the latter something less
than a free operator. It was this alleged state of affairs which renders the case
somewhat unusual
3 2
The petitioner met these arguments with the contention that the split was
merely a voluntary agreement giving no guaranteed access to film product to
either party. Each competitor negotiated alone with the distributors for the
product on its side of the split. The distributors had complete freedom with
respect to their choice of exhibitor for a given picture; they could refuse to
license the party to whom that picture may have been assigned on the split,
and instead license the other if the former party did not live up to the distribu-
tor's competitive expectations. The distributor, moreover, could demand com-
petitive bids for any particular picture.13 Although these arguments were ap-
parently considered unsatisfactory by the court, it is difficult to be certain which
of the opposing arguments raised by the Justice Department and the amicus
was preferred; the court's opinion contains nothing but the cryptic sentence on
competition excerpted above. The amicus' argument - which reduced to the
position that American Broadcasting-Paramount's "long purse" made com-
petitive bidding unacceptable regardless of whether petitioner bought the exist-
ing drive-in - was least likely to have carried the day, since it was clearly in-
consistent with the Government's position attacking the split. The Government,
on the other hand, never met petitioner's arguments, nor overcame the effect
of petitioner's point that the Government had approved and supported splits in
other situations. 13 4 Instead, the Government shifted emphasis and insisted that
in this particular case the split was illegal because the distributors had never
consented to it and the market division was in effect little more than a hori-
132. American Broadcasting-Paramount contested this point fiercely, putting on wit-
nesses who testified to the contrary and offering much evidence to support its position.
It is not at all clear from the record who had the best of the argument.
133. The product arrangement and inodus vivendi with the distributors described in
the text is very common. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 131. In fact, there is evidence
that genuine competitive bidding for product occurs in only a small proportion of the
total selling situations in the country - somewhere around 32%. See Cassady, Impact
of the Paramount Decisio on Motion Picture Distribution and Price Making, 31 So. Cz.
L. REv. 150, 161 n. 77 (1958). Whether or not the figure was then accurate, or is today,
seven years later, most industry attorneys interviewed insist that it is the exception rather
than the rule to find competitive bidding in any given situation.
134. See Testimony of Assistant Attorney General Barnes, Hearings Before Sub-
committee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. at
651-52 (1953); and Letter from Assistant Attorney General Lee Loevinger to Edward
Bennett Williams, Esq., dated June 25, 1962, Appendix to Brief for Petitioner, pp. 3a-4a,
Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 378 U.S. 123 (1964). The De-
partments intention was to encourage an equitable division of product in order to keep
all competing theatre owners in business.
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zontal conspiracy among competitors to restrict competition.186 Rather than
accepting any one of the competing arguments, the court seems to have decided
the case literally on the ground that petitioner did not carry its burden of proof;
if this was indeed the case, the court's decision was correct.1 30
In the same opinion, the court denied American Broadcasting-Paramount's
Fayetteville petition.'8 7 The Fayettezille and Poughkeepsie cases were in many
particulars quite similar - the major difference being only that the split of
product in Fayetteville received little or no emphasis. The court's opinion deny-
ing the petition can usefully be compared with its later opinion, entered after
a rehearing, granting the petition with restrictions. In the first opinion, the
denial, the court wrote:
I now turn to the proposed acquisition of the Boulder [sic: Boulevard]
Drive-in Theatre in Fayetteville .... The following persuasive objections
of the Government have not been sufficiently overcome: first, the proposed
acquisition will constitute a significant rise in petitioner's seating capacity
in the competitive area, thus tending to confer upon petitioner a more
dominant position; second, the acquisition would result in a very large
potential increase in petitioner's first-run capacity; third, this likelihood
of first-run dominance might well result in the effective discouragement
of first-run competition by competing drive-ins; fourth, the acquisition
would eliminate a potential first-run competitor; and lastly, the acquisi-
tion would restore petitioner to a favored competitive position comparable
to that it enjoyed when it was subjected to divestiture.188
Two months later, after a rehearing, the same court wrote:
Two considerations have been urgently pressed by petitioner which I think
justify the granting of the attached order. First, seven new theatres have
been opened in Fayetteville ... since the implementation of the consent
decree, thereby changing to a considerable degree the theatre situation in
this community. Second, the impact of the drive-in theatre activity upon
135. The "law of splits" has developed along peculiar lines. The support upon which
the dubious legality of this form of market division has been made to rest is whether
or not the distributors "acquiesce" in the division of their film product by the exhibitors
of a given locale. See cases cited supra, note 131. It would seem that the courts' main
concern in emphasizing such acquiescence is with whether or not the distributors have
been fairly treated. In any event, the law is settled that if a distributor did not consent
to the split, he may recover treble damages from the "conspiring" exhibitors. Samuel
Goldwyn Prods. v. Fox W. Coast Theatres Corp., 194 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Cal. 1961)
aff'd, sub. norn. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 85 S.Ct. 143 (1964). But, despite the posture of the present case
law on splits, the entire inquiry into the origin of the split, and thus its legality, went
only tangentially, at best, to the overall question whether the petitioner's purchase of
another theatre in Poughkeepsie would restrain trade. For, as will be argued in a sub-
sequent section, the existence of such a split of product should carry with it the pre-
sumption that the major theatres in the relevant market are competitive in the literal
sense. See text accompanying notes 236-242 infra.
136. Indeed such a result is demanded by the wording of the acquisitions clauses,
fixing the burden of proof upon the petitioner. See text supra note 10.
137. Both cases were decided in the same opinion; see note 124 supra.
138. See note 124 supra.
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this situation has substantially altered the basic considerations that gave
rise to the provisions of the consent decree in 1949 affecting this geo-
graphical area. 139
Accordingly, it granted the petition, "but subject to restrictions which should
prevent any unfair application of a first-run policy." The order, similar to the
one issued in the Hamden case, restricted petitioner's operation of the Boule-
vard Drive-in to subsequent run, subject to exceptions whenever its competi-
tors played first-run at their drive-ins.140
As the juxtaposition of the two opinions indicates, the decisive factor, over-
riding all the others mentioned, was the change in the competitive situation
since the Paramount decree was written about 13 years earlier. To the question
why this factor was decisive, no answer can be given. Although the affidavits
and briefs filed before and after the rehearing provide some clue to the court's
motivation, they do not justify its decision. In fact they make clear that com-
petition would not have been "unduly restrained" by the purchase, and provide
no basis for the highly restrictive decree which accompanied the final order.
There were 13 theatres in Fayetteville, 11 of them in operation.' 4 ' Five of
these were conventional houses, and six were drive-ins. Only one of these 11
theatres was operated by a true "independent," a small (300 car capacity) one-
theatre operator who was not contesting the acquisition. The remaining ten
were operated by powerful circuits: American Broadcasting-Paramount, the
petitioner (450 theatres), operated two of the five conventionals, one of them
on first-run; H.B. Meiselman (18 theatres), a protesting amicus, operated the
biggest and the best appointed first-run house in Fayetteville, 14' as well as three
of the six drive-ins, of which one with two screens was the largest; Stewart &
139. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 76016 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). (Hereinafter cited as Fayetteville II).
140. The order, dated March 9, 1962, read:
American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., or any subsidiary thereof, may
operate the Boulevard Drive-in Theatre on a first-run policy provided that it
shall not, in any year, operate the Boulevard... on first-ruan in excess of the num-
ber of weeks that a Fayetteville drive-in competitor operates a drive-in or theatre
or theatres on first-run. It is provided, however that in any year AB-PT, Inc.,
may play the Boulevard... on first-run from an additional period not exceeding
three weeks, but in that event AB-PT, Inc. shall not play the Boulevard ... on
first-run the following year until a drive-in competitor has been on first-run for
a period equal to the additional period of the previous year and thereafter (except
for the three week leeway period applicable to the current year) only to the extent
that such additional period is exceeded by a drive-in competitor.
141. One of the 11, a drive-in was operated solely as a restaurant. The data on the
theatres in the Fayetteville area and the facts concerning them set out in the text were
uncontested in the proceedings. The Post-Hearing Memorandum of American Broadcast-
ing-Paramount Theatres, Inc., dated Feb. 2, 1962, and filed in the Southern District of
New York on that date, has provided the primary source. The number of theatres and
their ownership, characteristics, etc., appears id. pp. 4, 6.
142. Meiselman so testified (hearing Transcript I, pp. 38, 42, 47), see Post-Hearing
Memorandum, supra note 114, p. 5.
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Everett Theatres, Inc. (55 theatres) operated the two remaining conventionals,
one of them on first-run; Consolidated Theatres, Inc. (then a 28-theatre chain)
operated the remaining two drive-ins, of which one was concededly the "nicest"
in town. The Boulevard Drive-in, which petitioner wanted to buy, was the
fourth largest of the seven major drive-ins, 43 and had been up for sale for some
time. Amicus Meiselman had turned it down as a bad investment.144 Thus after
the purchase American Broadcasting-Paramount would own one of the three
first-run conventional houses, and one, the fourth largest of seven drive-ins.
Its competitors were, with the exception of one very small subsequent-run
operator, strong and successful circuits, all of them including the amicus 146
hardly in need of the protection from competition so generously provided them
by the court. In the face of such a competitive situation, it is difficult to under-
stand the Government's opposition to the petition and the court's initial refusal
to grant it. Had it not finally been granted, the Meiselman and Consolidated
Circuits would have been effectively insulated from significant drive-in com-
petition. As it was, the judicial restraint on the Boulevard Drive-in's ability to
compete came close to accomplishing the same result.
IV. THE EcoNxomIcs OF THE ACQUISITIONS CASES: MoRE
QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS
A. Factors Considered by the Court in Passing on Acquisition Petitions
Under the Paramount Decrees.
If the preceding cases leave the reader vaguely dissatisfied with their out-
come,' the explanation most likely lies in their economic results and the legal
reasoning which produced them. It therefore seems appropriate to analyze the
reasoning of the court and the Department of Justice with respect to its eco-
nomic validity. Before undertaking this analysis, however, it will be helpful to
identify and summarize the various factors which have led to decision in the
majority of acquisition cases. To a certain extent such a listing of factors may
be arbitrary and may inadequately represent all the considerations which have
led to any given decision. Despite this possibility, the following description of
the most frequent and important factors provides a useful shorthand manner
of setting forth the foundation upon which the economic reasoning of the ac-
quisition cases seems to rest.
1. Population and commercial growth and movement into the surrounding
area
This factor is usually present in petitions to construct new facilities; other-
-wise only in exceptional cases would the circuit be interested in investing in
the particular vicinity in question. It is less frequently present in cases involv-
143. It was the third largest of those in operation as drive-ins. Post-Hcaring
Memorandum, supra note 114, pp. 4, 6.
144. Id. p. 28. See also Affidavit of Haliburton Fales, II, Attorney for American
Broadcasting-Paramount, in support of Motion for Reargument, dated Jan. 5, 1962, p. 8.
145. See text supra at notes 141-143.
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ing pre-existing theatres, since these petitions, typically to purchase drive-ins,
are generally motivated by a desire to diversify and do not depend upon market
growth, The court uses growth in connection with its assessment of the com-
petitive effect of a purchase or construction of a theatre: for example, whether
the present and projected growth of an area will support additional theatre
capacity.
2. The petitioning circuit's percentage of the market relative to its percentage
at the time of the Paramount decrees
If the petitioning circuit had operated theatres in the relevant area prior to
the Paranount decrees, the court's first inquiry has been what disposition of
these theatres did the decrees make? The divestiture clauses of each decree,
which forced the sale of at least one and sometimes more than one theatre in
every situation where the defendant circuit monopolized first-run exhibition,
attempted to make each exhibition market reasonably competitive. If the par-
ticular situation was reasonably competitive, the Paramount decrees permitted
the spin-off circuit to retain all its theatres in that area. This disposition in the
vicinity surrounding the proposed acquisition has given rise in the acquisition
proceedings to the unstated presumption that the petitioner's market position
as established by the decrees was sufficiently competitive to satisfy the demands
of the antitrust laws. Consequently, the ratio of circuit holdings to independent
theatres after the Paramount decrees were implemented is presumed to pro-
vide a rule of thumb by which the competitive effect of an acquisition may be
judged. If the proposed construction or purchase will increase the petitioner's
holdings past its percentage of total theatres in the particular area at the time
of the Paramount decrees, the construction or purchase is presumptively un-
lawful.148 While this factor was an important reason for the denial of at least
one petition, and seems to have been the cause of several others, its role is
much more important in those petitions which were granted. 47 In these cases
the court relied heavily upon the fact that the petitioning circuit presently held
considerably fewer theatres than the Paramount decrees permitted, and thus
that its competitive position had weakened.
3. Petitioner's market position in terms of the number of theatres it controls
This factor differs from the one preceding in that it applies whether or not
the petitioner owned theatres in the relevant competitive area at the time of
Paramount. It is irrelevant, of course, if the petitioner is making an initial
entry into a given market. But wlere the additional theatre will be super-
imposed on a circuit's existing market position, an inquiry is made to deter-
mine whether the petitioner will become the "dominant" exhibitor if another
theatre is added to those presently under its control in that market.148 If such
146. See, e.g., the court's language in the Wilkes-Barre opinion denying the acqui-
sition.
147. See, e.g., the court's language on this point in the Fayelteville II opinion.
148. It was to this point that the Government was speaking in its Mifemorandum
on the Hamden acquisition, supra note 9. All of the Representative Cases deal with this
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"dominance" is found, it is assumed that competition will be "unduly re-
strained."'1 49 The assessment is usually made in terms of straight market per-
centages: 'it is asked what percentage of the total theatres in operation will
petitioner control (a) altogether, and (b) on the particular run in question?
4. Petitioner's percentage of total seating capacity in the relevant market
This factor, which also goes to an assessment of overall market position,
appears only in acquisition cases concerning pre-existing theatres, although it
is not readily apparent why this should be so. All the seats in all of petitioner's
theatres in the vicinity are added together and compared to the total number
of seats in the area. Like the percentage of total theatres which the petitioner
operates, there seems to be a tipping point somewhere on the seating-percent-
age scale which when reached leads the court to hold that the proposed ac-
quisition will "unduly restrain competition."' 5
0
5. The location of competing theatres in relation to the theatre to be con-
structed or purchased
This factor is of very great importance in all cases. The court generally
speaks of the number of theatres located within a given radius of the proposed
or pre-existing theatre in the process of defining the relevant competitive mar-
ket within which effects on competition are to be assessed. In the petition itself,
in the supporting and contesting affidavits, and in the argument at the hearing,
much effort is customarily expended in computing geographic distances and in
determining from which centers of population a given theatre does, or is likely
to, draw its patrons.
issue, as do many others not discussed because of space limitations. See, e.g., United
States v. Loew's, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. 80264 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. Loew's,
Inc. (National-General), 1961 Trade Cas. 77675 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
149. For examples of judicial language see text at notes 125-126, 138 supra.
150. The Wilkes-Barre, Poughkeepsie, and Fayetteville I cases are all prime ex-
amples. The court's opinion in Wilkes-Barre, denying the acquisition, clearly illustrates
the manner in which factors two, three and four work together. Factor five, to be dis-
cussed in the text infra, seems to have been thrown in merely for good measure. In
Wilkes-Barre, the court wrote:
American-Paramount already owns two theatres in this area accounting for ap-
proximately 13.7% of seating capacity. . . . Petitioner's foremost competitor . . .
owns five theatres and accounts for approximately 33.16 per cent of the seating
capacity. The other theatres are independently owned....
The Government and three of petitioner's competitors have opposed the acqui-
sition. The Court agrees with them that American-Paramount has not sustained
its burden of showing that competition will not be unduly restrained. The acqui-
sition of Midway by American-Paramount will increase the latter's percentage
of seating capacity to 16.68 per cent. This figure represents a greater percentage
than that held by American-Paramount when the Consent Judgment was entered,
although the market has substantially declined since the date of that judgment.
The combined capacity, moreover, of the two largest concerns, petitioner and
Comerford [which owned the five theatres above mentioned], would increase to
50.3 per cent as another independent competitor of these two chains is eliminated.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 77102 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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6. Whether the petitioning circuit is purchasing a competitor
In some cases, the absence of this factor appears as one of several reasons
for granting the petition ;151 and in a few instances, particularly Wilkes-Barre,
Poughkeepsie, and Fayetteville I, the presence of this factor provided one of
the reasons for denial. As might be expected, wheh this factor was considered,
the successful petitions all involved to-be-constructed facilities, and the denials,
pre-existing theatres. However, in some pre-existing theatre acquisitions, Fay-
etteville II for example, the court disregarded this consideration entirely.
7. Whether the petitioner's behavior has been anticonipctitive
This factor is considered by the court, frequently in great detail, whenever
it is advanced by the Department of Justice or a contesting amicus curiae. In
the cases in which it has been significant, it has been considered in all three
temporal dimensions. The petitioner's past and present practices in film buying,
its agreements with distributors with regard to runs and clearances, and its
relations with competitors are scrutinized to determine whether they are, or
have been, anticompetitive and violative of the antitrust lawsY5 2 If so, the con-
tinuation of such relations and practices in the future in the operation of the
new theatre is presumed; and the court considers this a weighty reason to
find that granting the petition is likely to "unduly restrain competition."
Two caveats seem warranted, however. The cases indicate that none of
the seven factors is given any particular weight in relation to the others in the
court's determinations. A factor which seems decisive in one case may be
accorded little or no weight in the next, with no apparent explanation. Nor
can the seemingly ad hoc weighting of these factors be attributed to the factual
patterns of the various cases. In addition, the factors appear and disappear
from the court's opinions in a totally unpredictable manner. The court seems
to treat each case as sui generis, and no case has precedential value.le Curious-
151. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. 80264, 80265 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
152. This factor frequently appears in the cases under the rubric "unclean hands."
Typical is the Stanley Warner Corporation's acquisition in the King of Prussia Plaza,
Montgomery County, Pa., United States v. Warner Bros., Pictures, Inc., 1964 Trade
Cas. 79239 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas.
79309 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). But this is an inaccurate usage of the equity doctrine of "unclean
hands"; for it is a doctrine which, if properly applied, would shut the petitioning circuit
out of court in limine. See 2 Poiszoy, EQur, JUarsPRODENCE 91-92 (5th ed., Symons
rev., 1941). This has never happened. In practice, the court merely considers allegations
of unfair competition, anti-competitive practices or "unclean hands" along with its con-
sideration of competitive effects, and from time to time will impose a restriction upon
the circuit's operation of its new theatre or other theatres in the area, in order to protect
competitors against the alleged anticompetitive practices. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's,
Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 76373 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1961 Trade
Cas. 77675 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
153. This type of antitrust adjudication is subject to criticism in its own right, re-
gardless of its effects: 'Even in a predominantly common law field such as antitrust
the courts should not of course write afresh with each case, for the common law itself
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ly, the parties have acquiesced in this total lack of predictability, and have
never attempted to analogize pending to past petitions even where the com-
petitive situations looked identical.
B. An Economic Analysis of the Legal Criteria
As the previous discussion of the representative cases and of the seven
factors that appear in them illustrates, the court has assumed that the "un-
duly restrain competition" standard is met if the purchase or construction is
proved likely to provide the petitioning circuit with a "dominant" position in
the relevant market. Although the term "dominance" appears in most opinions,
the court has never explained what it means to be "dominant" in a market.
Perhaps this failure of articulation is caused by a more fundamental omission
- the failure in any case to define what product-line or geographic area con-
stitutes the relevant market. With respect to determining the relevant product-
line, the court usually has relied upon the run - first or subsequent - which
the theatre to be constructed or purchased would play, assuming quite correct-
ly that first and subsequent run product do not directly compete with one an-
other.16 Thus if the new theatre was to play first-run, the court's inquiry into
competitive effect was usually made in the first-run product market.155 But
even with so obvious a yardstick, the court has occasionally been inconsistent.
In some instances, it has concerned itself with the competitive effects in all
runs when only one was affected ;15O and in dealing with percentages of seating
capacity and number of theatres possessed by the petitioner, both of them
decisive factors in determining "dominance," the court has aggregated thea-
tres playing both first and subsequent run.rT
With respect to definition of the relevant geographic market affected by an
acquisition, the court has opted for maximum flexibility, and consequently has
created maximum uncertainty. In each case where some noises are made about
the relevant geographic market, the location of the theatres considered com-
petitive with the proposed acquisition seems to provide the starting point for
the court's analysis. Sometimes this analysis is made in terms of actual lineal
distance between the theatres in blocks or miles, 5 8 and sometimes in terms of
places great value upon continuity of doctrine." Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per
So Concept; Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YA=E L.J. 775, 780 (1965).
154. See text accompanying notes 166-170, infra.
155. See, e.g., National Theatres' (now National General's) San Jose, Calif. acqui-
sition, United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 76373-374 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The
court followed this procedure in the Hainden and Cheltenham cases.
156. This seems to have been what happened in the La Mirada case, for example,
and in the Wilkes-Barre case, see discussion supra note 150.
157. Examples are the La Mirada, Wilkes-Barre, Poughkeepsie, Payelleville, and
Garde n Grove cases, discussed in the previous section.
158. Rarely, if ever, has a discussion of measured distances appeared in an opinion
other than in terms of fixed radii outward from the site of a proposed acquisition, But
the records of the proceedings in several cases indicate that lineal distances are often
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each theatre's location with regard to the particular population centers from
which it will draw its patrons.5 9 But, in something approaching a majority
of cases, the court has given no inkling as to how it determined who competes
with whom. 60 The problem is further complicated by the fact that there are
several important opinions in which the location of competing theatres is no-
where mentioned.' 6 '
When the relevant market has been defined and articulated in terms of the
distances between the theatre to be purchasd or built and other theatres, the
court has customarily made no more than a terse descriptive statement that,
for example, within a 10-mile radius there are 24 theatres. From this is drawn
a conclusion as to whether the acquisition, if a new theatre, will drive others
out of business, or whether the acquisition, new or pre-exdsting, will enable
the petitioner to "dominate" the exhibition field in the area. In no reported
case is there any suggestion of why a given radius was chosen. Moreover,
when nothing more than a flat numerical quantity of theatres within a certain
matters of dispute; and the court takes great interest in such distances. One exchange
between court and counsel gives excellent illustration:
THE CounR: I would like to be enlightened with respect to the distances you claim
is [sic] between your theatre and these competing theatres.
Mi. PacoRA: May I make an opening Statement?
THE CoIRT: I hardly think it would help me. I have read your papers . .. I
know what you are going to try to prove. I told you that the only elements that
concern me, at least at first blush, is [sic] the fact that there is an attack upon the
distances that you have represented to the Court.
Cheltenham hearing Transcript, supra note 67, at p. 23.
159. This approach is best exemplified by United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 78800 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), a case wherein Stanley Warner was per-
mitted to construct a 1500-car capacity drive-in theatre in Camden, New Jersey. Here
the amici curiae were read out of court because the court determined that their theatres
would draw their patronage from different population areas. The court wrote that the
amid's drive-ins were
in separate and unique positions from the standpoint of their draw on Philadelphia
patronage and their competitive relationship to petitioner's new theatre. I cannot
conclude, on the facts before me, that petitioner's drive-in would provide them
with any valid ground for complaint.
Id. at 78801.
160. In situations where the theatres on a given run often play day-and-date - that
is, where multiple runs are common - this failure of articulation can be especially damag-
ing. In La Mirada, for example, it would seem obvious that the new theatre would not
compete with all first run houses within the 13-mile radius; a relatively well-defined
submarket structure must have existed. See .rnpra notes 57 and 103. A recent and as
yet unreported, opinion, United States v. Loew's, Inc., (National General) April 6, 1965,
see note 180 infra, indicates that the court is now beginning to recognize and to utilize
in its decisions, the submarket structure created by distributors in establishing multiple
first runs. Here the San Fernando Valley was considered the broader market, and a
section lying west of the San Diego Freeway, a relevant submarket.
161. This was the case in the Wilkes-Barre, Poughkeepsie, and Fayetteville opinions,
denying the petitions. There are also many examples in opinions granting the petitions.
See, e.g., the Hamden and Cheltenham cases.
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radius is given, without any regard to whether or not they are competitive in
terms of runs and clearances with the proposed theatre, the figures are largely
meaningless. Even assuming that the number of theatres was descriptive of
some competitive picture, there has never been any attempt to lay down stand-
ards for fixing the length of the radius. In some cases, the relevant market
has been as small as a neighborhood or section of a large city ;'s- in others it
has been the entire city and one or more suburban communities taken to-
gether ;163 and in the remaining cases the relevant market has been an arbi-
trarily chosen radius of 5, 7, 10, or 13 miles.164 The court's decision to consider
a. 13-mile radius containing 48 theatres in the Stanley Warner La Mirada case
is a graphic example of arbitrary market definition. No explanation of the
13-mile radius has ever been offered other than that the petitioner owned one
other theatre 13 miles away, on the outskirts of Los Angeles. Presumably, if
this theatre had been located 15 miles away, a 15-mile radius would have been
chosen.
These difficulties of market definition have been compounded by the court's
failure to differentiate between the two different levels of the product market
- that in which the theatre operator purchases product and that in which he
exhibits it to his patrons. Presumably, despite the courts' failure to so state,
the market with which the antitrust laws and Paramount decrees are ultimate-
ly concerned is the patron market. For competition on all levels of film pro-
duction, distribution, and exhibition is waged for the custom of the theatre-
going public; and it is the patron's dollar which supplies the source of all
motion picture revenues. 16 5 Yet the court has most frequently, and almost
162. This was the market definition in the Cheltediamn case. See text accompanying
notes 67-85 supra, Cheltenham being a relatively small section of Philadelphia.
163. This was the market definition in the Hamden case. See text accompanying
notes 91-104 supra, all of the Greater New Haven area being taken as the relevant market;
in National General's Phoenix, Arizona acquisition, 1961 Trade Cas. 77675 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) all of Phoenix and the surrounding area; in Stanley Warner's Houston acquisi-
tion, 1964 Trade Cas. 80180 (S.D.N.Y.) all of Houston; and in Loew's Rocky River,
Ohio, petition, 1964 Trade Cas. 80264 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) all of Cleveland and its western
metropolitan suburbs.
164. See, e.g., National General's San Jose, Calif., acquisition, United States v.
Loew's, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 76373 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (10-mile radius); and Stanley
Warner's La Mirada case. (13-mile and seven-mile radii).
165. United States v. Paramount, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) dealt almost exclusively
with the first-run exhibition market, "the cream of the exhibition business," id. at 166, 173;
the issue was which exhibitors would get this business. The emphasis throughout Para-
mount was therefore upon product licensing practices, product distribution, and the
control of first-run product in the hands of the five major circuits. Yet, Paramotint must
be viewed as ultimately and chiefly concerned with the patron market. The reason is that
monopoly has traditionally and properly been considered harmful for its effects on con-
sumers and on the allocation of the nation's economic resources. Permitting monopoly
to exist at any level in the production-distribution-exhibition chain is to sanction re-
striction of output and prices higher than a competitive market would otherwise have
dictated. Therefore, even though the arguments in the Paramount case were pitched in
terms of the film-purchasing market, consumer want satisfaction was the value at stake
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exclusively, concerned itself with the status of competition in purchasing prod-
uct alone. While this is confusing, it is not necessarily incorrect. Indeed the
relationship between the product-purchasing market and the patron market is
one of interdependence. The economics of the motion picture industry indicate
that the ability of a circuit to obtain more top quality product than any of its
competitors in a relevant geographic area will enable it to dominate the patron
market in that area. On the other hand, a theatre more attractive than others
will act as a lure to patrons and enable the operator to obtain more easily top
quality product. The important point is that the product market has a tvo-
layered structure which must always be considered in analyzing the competi-
tive effects of an acquisition.
Even assuming that the market definition problems can be adequately
solved, the question of what constitutes a dominant position still remains. The
court has assumed that dominant position can be shown by determining the
petitioner's percentage of an area's total seating capacity and of its total num-
ber of theatres then in operation. There are two separate problems in this
procedure. First, are seating capacity and number of theatres reliable indices
of dominance? Second, assuming that they are, what percentage can be pre-
sumed, from the existing case law, to be illegal as "unduly restraining com-
petition"? Despite ten years of active experience with litigation under the
acquisition clauses, neither the Department of Justice nor the court has ad-
dressed itself to these questions.
All available evidence indicates that seating capacity is a highly unreliable
factor for determining whether an acquisition will give the acquiring circuit
dominance in the relevant market. In the first place, the manner in which it
has been computed in all cases to date is erroneous. In FayetteVille I, Pough-
keepsie, and Wilkes-Barre, for example, drive-in and conventional theatre
capacities were aggregated as if seats in cars and seats in theatres were totally
fungible. This, however, is demonstrably untrue. Drive-ins are operable only
at night and in reasonably good weather, and can serve only the motorized
segment of the public. Such limitations are very considerable, and indicate
quite clearly that the capacities of these two very different types of theatre
facilities are in no meaningful way interchangeable. Additional error is intro-
duced because present computations, even where inclusive of only one or the
other type of theatre facility, have consistently neglected obvious differences
in the condition, equipment, and appointments of the drive-ins or conventionals
the seats of which were being aggregated. An exhibitor with two modem, well-
appointed houses but with only 25 per cent of his area's seating capacity, may
be in a far stronger competitive position than an exhibitor with three "dread-
naughts" containing 60 or 70 per cent of total area capacity.
in the case. On the maximization of consumer want satisfaction as an over-riding goal
of the antitrust laws, whether implemented in terms of the rule of reason or the per
se rule, see Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Marhct
Division, 74 Y.LE J. 775, 781, 805 (1965).
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Finally, it is misleading to add together the seats of first- and subsequent-
run houses. For purposes of analyzing the competitive situation in an area,
first-run and subsequent-run houses should not be treated as in the same
product market, either on the purchasing level or on the patron level. With
regard to the purchasing level, houses on different runs do not usually com-
pete for the same films; only rarely, if ever, do first-run houses show subse-
quent-run films and subsequent-run houses, first-run films.10 0 The Supreme
Court in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.1 67 explicitly recognized
this differentiation between the two film purchasing markets.1 68 In the patron
market, the differentiation between runs is not so clear; however, for the pur-
poses of analysis, it is justifiable to treat first and subsequent run theatres
as not being competitive for the same patrons. This differentiation is unclear
because there are a variety of intangible, and perhaps largely fortuitous, factors
which create a certain degree of cross-elasticity of demand. As any movie-
goer knows, his choice between runs may depend on the relative quality of the
pictures in each run, and on whether or not he missed the better film on its first-
run; for this reason it is to be expected that "Mary Poppins," "Lawrence of
Arabia," or "My Fair Lady," will provide on their subsequent runs far more
competition to the first-run films then playing, than would more mediocre
product. Other intangibles are the relative convenience of location of the sub-
sequent-run neighborhood houses, the weather in the case of drive-ins, and the
desire to see a double rather than a single feature. The importance of these
considerations should not be overestimated, however, since the first-run film
is at the center of the industry's publicity, and since television is taking an in-
creasingly large share of the subsequent-run business from the theatres.
In addition, despite the non-quantifiable factors which make different runs
in some degree competitive, industry distribution practice and exhibitor pric-
ing patterns testify that this inter-run competition for the patron's dollar has
been rendered insubstantial. The fact is that the patron markets for different
runs have been effectively insulated from each other. This insulation of patron
markets has been accomplished by the devices of runs, clearances, and exclusive
showings within geographical zones; these devices effectively enforce price
discrimination between runs, by making the patron wait a considerable time
166. Several qualifications of this statement are in order. Changing a theatre's nu
position from time to time is not unknown. By renovation and the requisite increased
investment, a subseqient-run house with a good location and adequate parking, can
easily be moved up to first-run. Moreover, in periods of severe shortage of quality first-
run product, first-run theatres are known to play superior second-run film. Finally,
among less competitive houses playing on multiple first or subsequent runs, some shifting
of playing position is common. The explanation offered has usually been that not all
films are suitable for multiple showings in day-and-dated theatres. Hence, from time
to time, a product shortage develops in such areas. But these are minor qualifications,
and have traditionally been disregarded by the courts and the industry at large.
167. 334 U.S. 131 (1948)."
168. See discussion of this point supra, note 165.
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or travel a considerable distance if he wants to pay less to see the same filmi co
The effectiveness of this insulation between runs is amply demonstrated by
the pre-Parainount history of the exhibition industry. This history indicates
that the exhibitor defendants only were interested in monopolizing the first-run
exhibition market. Their tactics and behavior proved that the most knowledge-
able operators in the industry were convinced that it was unnecessary to
achieve similar control of the subsequent-run exhibition market to obtain the
advantages of monopoly 170 Thus, although the patron market cannot be abso-
lutely divided according to runs, aggregating a circuit's seating capacity
irrespective of runs will only fortuitously reflect the circuit's actual competitive
stance in the relevant geographic market.
Even without errors in computation, however, a seating capacity percentage
figure is totally irrelevant to any rational consideration of an additional thea-
tre's competitive impact. With regard to the market in which films are pur-
chased, this conclusion is immediately evident when it is remembered that
product must be offered by each of the major distributors, all of whom were
defendants in the Paramount case, no other way than theatre-by-theatre, film-
by-film, pursuant to the Paramount injunctions.' 7 ' Since he is not given the
opportunity, a multi-theatre operator is prevented from aggregating his total
seating capacity on any particular run in one bid. For this reason, what counts
is the seating capacity of the individual theatre for which a particular film is
being sought. In any case, no exhibitor would desire to play the same film in
more than one of his theatres unless they were in different competitive markets.
But even if the seating capacity of two or more theatres is not aggregated,
and dominance is found in the seating capacity of the additional theatre, that
is, by a one-to-one comparison of the petitioner's theatres with those of the
competitors, this finding would contribute little to a determination that the
theatre to be constructed or purchased will "unduly restrain competition" in
the product market. Although the court has never explained the significance
of seating capacity as such, the unarticulated premise must be that the ex-
169. CONANT 58-61, 65-69, passim.
170. Id. at 61-69, passim. Because of the run and clearance structure throughout the
country prior to United States v. Paramount, the defendants channeled 30 to 70 per
cent of all rentals into first run. In Chicago and Washington, D.C., the figure was
between 35-50%, and in Atlanta, it was 70%. Id. at 66-68.
171. Typical of the injunctions running against the Paramount defendants is the
following, taken from the Warner Consent Judgment:
The defendant Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corporation, its subsidiaries
in which it has more than a fifty per cent interest, its successors, its officers, agents,
servants and employees are each hereby enjoined:
7. From performing or entering into any license in which the right to exhibit one
feature is conditioned upon the licensee's taking one or more other features.
8. From licensing any feature for exhibition upon any run in any theatre in any
other manner than that each license shall be offered and taken theatre by theatre,
solely upon the merits and without discrimination in favor of affiliated theatres,
circuit theatres or others.
Wyarner Consent Judgment, 111 (7) and (8), supra note 8.
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hibitor with the largest number of seats will be able to outbid his competitors,
Seating capacity, to a distributor, however, is never the sole criterion of an
acceptable bid; other factors have equal and frequently greater weight. Offered
dates of showing - known in the trade as the exhibitor's availability - length
of run promised, amount of clearance over competitors desired by the ex-
hibitor, percentage of gross receipts offered, and the parking facilities and
physical appointments as well as the location of each theatre, are included in
the distributor's evaluation of every bid received.172 Although these considera-
tions will have varying weights depending upon the nature of the film and
the particular segment of the movie-going public at which the product is aimed,
it is obvious that seating capacity by itself can only be determinative when in
the subjective judgment of the distributor all other considerations are equal or
nearly equal - definitely a rare occurrence. Thus, for example, in the Chel-
tenham situation, the 800 seat Yorktown could have outbid the 1200 seat Frlen
by offering a longer run, assuming contrary to the facts in that case that all
other things had been equal. Similarly, for particular types of movies, aimed at
college communities for example, a theatre location near a college may cancel
out a more distant competitor's otherwise insuperable seating advantage.
The above criticism of the seating capacity factor has dealt exclusively with
the market in which film is purchased. Seating capacity, as a factor in domi-
nance, is equally fallacious when applied to the patron market, since both
markets are entirely interdependent. The court has apparently assumed that
the number of seats a circuit possesses will determine in a rough way its share
of the revenue from ticket sales to theatre patrons, that is, its share of an area's
total theatre patronage. A theatre chain, however, is dominant on paper alone,
regardless of how high a percentage of total seating capacity it possesses, if
it cannot fill those seats with patrons. A circuit may control 75 per cent of an
area's empty seats, but if some or all are in poorly equipped, poorly located,
old and out-dated theatres, the circuit will be unable to attract top quality
product from the distributors and therefore be unable to obtain anything near
75 per cent of the patron market. The remaining 25 per cent of capacity may
be in the hands of theatre owners operating competitively superior houses.
This is exactly what happened in Philadelphia, where the Stanley Warner
Circuit, after the divestitures required by the Paramount decrees, controlled
54 theatres, giving it a decidedly dominant position in terms of seating capacity.
Yet, instead of overpowering its competitors, it was forced by the competitive
shellacking it received to close or sell 35 of these houses in less than ten
years. 7 3
172. The Supreme Court took special notice of this complexity in the evaluation of
bids, and for this reason refused to force competitive auction bidding on the industry; it
was simply too complicated for the judiciary to police. United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 162-63 (1948). Small theatre size can in fact be an advantage.
See text accompanying notes 193-198 and note 197 infra.
173. Stanley Warner inherited from its parent, Warner Bros., 65 theatres in the
City of Philadelphia. It was required to divest 11, leaving 54, and of its own accord sold,
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There is yet another serious debility to the empty-seat capacity factor; it
ignores rate of turnover. Very often one of the largest and nicest of a circuit's
houses in a competitive area will be used for long-term road-show exhibitions
like "My Fair Lady," tying up that house on a reserved seat, one-or-twro show
a day basis. Meanwhile, a major competing theatre may draw two or three
times as many patrons in a single day - especially on weekends - by showing
its films four or five times daily.
It follows, from this analysis that empty-seat capacity must be viewed very
differently depending upon the market under discussion. Although empty seat-
ing capacity is a significant factor, albeit only one of several important factors,
in the film-purchasing market, it is deceptive in the patron market. For these
very. same reasons, the correct yardstick of patron-market share must be the
petitioning circuit's percentage of the number of seats actually filled in a given
time period. In other words, the decisive factor should be the petitioner's pres-
ent percentage of total theatre attendance,17 4 and an estimate of the amount
by which this percentage is likely to be increased by the purchase or construc-
tion of an additional facility.
When such an approach is taken, yet another conclusion appears inescap-
able: the measure of a circuit's dominance based upon its percentage of the
total theatres operating in the relevant competitive area, is similarly erroneous.
Since the decisive factor in determining a circuit's share of the patron market
must be its percentage of the total theatre attendance over a given period of
time, the number of theatres operated by the circuit in the relevant geographic
market is immaterial. The experience of the Stanley Warner Circuit in Phila-
delphia after the Paramount decrees provides irrefutable testimony in sup-
port of this proposition.
Use of a circuit's total number of theatres in a relevant geographic market
to determine dominance in the film-purchasing market is equally without foun-
dation, although here the explanation lies not in motion picture economics but
in the governing antitrust law. All the major distributors and the four spin-
off circuits are bound by the Paramount injunctions, banning "circuit buying"
closed, or permitted the lease to expire on 35 additional houses. United States v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. (Cheltenham), 1960 Trade Cas. 77397 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); (King of
Prussia), 1964 Trade Cas. 79239 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). There has been some discrepancy
in the exact figures; the author has been assured, however, that the above figures are
correct. Interview with Mr. Stuart Aarons of the office of the General Attorney, Stanley
Warner Corp., in New York City, April 9, 1965.
174. By this is meant paid admissions. Stanley Warner (SW) used these figures
quite effectively against amicus Ellis who was contesting SW's Cheltenham acquisition.
See text accompanying notes 67-85 supra. In this case SW clearly proved that the Ellis
Circuit was the most successful exhibitor in the immediate area, with 265,000 paid
admissions at its Erlen theatre, which was on first-neighborhood run, and 135,000 paid
admissions at its Renel theatre, which was on subsequent run, during the previous year.
Stanley Warner's Yorktown, in the meantime, only had 154,304. Petitioner's Mfemo-
randum on the Facts, United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. (Cheltenham), mipra
note 67, p. 11.
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and requiring that film product be offered by the distributors on a film-by-film,
theatre-by-theatre basis. Therefore, in, any given competitive situation, only
one of a circuit's theatres can compete or negotiate for a particular film. Thus
existing competitors of an acquiring circuit will not be forced to bid against
all of that circuit's theatres in the relevant area. Rather, the competitive situa-
tion, in terms of the number of houses competing for any specific picture, will
remain the same after the purchase or construction; one theatre - perhaps
the new one - will still compete with one theatre of each of the circuit's
competitors. It seems to follow that if a petitioner has at least one strong and
viable competitor in the field able to deprive it of quality product, the petitioner,
regardless of how many houses it may operate in the same market, should
not be considered "dominant," whatever this term may mean. In such a view,
number of theatres is as meaningless as seating capacity. Both rest upon prem-
ises unfounded in either the industry's economics or the rules of law presently
governing its operation.
If the above criticism of the factors used to determine dominance are tem-
porarily disregarded, and inquiry is focused on the next step in legal analysis
- determining the percentages of total seating capacity and number of thea-
tres which presumptively give a circuit dominance - the court's performance
remains highly unsatisfactory. Whether there is any particular percentage
which is presumptively illegal, what that percentage is, and when it will be
determinative, has remained a mystery. Each case seems to have been treated
sui generis and inconsistencies between individual petitions have been dis-
regarded. In Wilkes-Barre the court specifically found petitioner's possession
of 16.68 per cent of seating capacity too great when viewed alone, and espe-
cially damning when viewed in connection with its leading competitor's 33.16
per cent of capacity. 175 In Fayetteville II, however, the petition was finally
granted, albeit with restrictions, even though petitioner thereby obtained 23.61
per cent or 27.85 per cent of capacity in the area, depending upon whether the
petitioner's or the Government's statistics are accepted. 170 In other cases,
175. See note 150 mipra.
176. Fayetteville II, Affidavit of Haiburton Fales, II, Attorney for American Broad-
casting-Paramount, in support of Motion for Reargument, Jan. 5, 1962, p. 4.
The only difference between Wilkes-Barre and Fayetteville II is that the court found
in the latter that petitioner's capacity since the date of the Paramount decrees had de-
creased in relation to its competitors, while in Wilkes-Barre petitioner's capacity had
increased. If this is offered as a means of reconciling the cases, it must surely fall,
for it does not explain why 16.68% of capacity in one market is illegal while 23 to
27% of another is not. *To say without more that a percentage of a local market - de-
fined in terms of seating capacity - greater than that which was permitted by the
decrees is presumptively illegal for all time to come, is merely to raise the same question
at one step removed: why should this presumption be accepted when it conflicts with
results considered permissible in other cases? But, more important, the final theatre
disposition in any local market provided by the Paramount decrees should be rejected
in toto as a valid indicium of legal market share. For the divestiture clauses of the
decrees which rearranged circuit holdings in scores of towns and cities paid no attention
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similarly high percentages were also apparently legal. Recently, for example,
the court tpproved without restriction three petitions giving American Broad-
casting-Paramount roughly 32 per cent of a competitive area's total capacity,"T'
and well over 50 per cent of that in two other areas.& 8 Similar irreconcilable
conflict appears between the cases where the court was concerned with the
number of theatres which a petitioner operated in a given competitive area
either on a particular run or on all runs. In the Hamden case control of two
out of five theatres on first-run was considered too many, and in Cheltenham
two out of four. Yet American Broadcasting-Paramount was recently per-
mitted to build a sizable two-auditorium theatre in Gainesville, Florida, and
another in Chattanooga, Tennessee, despite the fact that both acquisitions
would give it two of the four first-run theatres in each community."0 The
whatsoever to percentages of seating capacity or of total theatres held by a defendant
circuit. The decrees were addressed to opening up "closed" or monopolized towms and
in pursuance of this objective required a theatre or two to be divested. See note 207 infra.
Whether a town was competitive or closed was decided in strictly pragmatic terms: vere
there other competitive theatres which would supply alternative outlets for exhibition?
What percentage of seats these competitors held was not considered relevant.
177. The first of these is located in Gainesville, Florida. Petitioner proposed the
construction of an 1100-seat conventional theatre to play first-run. It also owned the
1,035-seat Florida theatre which met major first-run competition only from the State, an
old 826-seat theatre. The Rose, a 573-seat Negro theatre, a 450-car drive-in, and a 400-car
drive-in also played first-run, but only intermittently. The Vometco theatre chain w'as
then building a 1200-seat first-run house 0.8 miles from the new site. United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., Petition Feb. 19, 1965 (no opinion; order unreported)
(hereinafter cited as the Gainesville acquisition). If the traditional industry figure of 22
persons (seats) per car is used, petitioner would have 2135 seats of 6604 seats on all
runs, or 32% of total seating capacity. If conventional theatres alone are included, then
American Broadcasting-Paramount would have 2135 seats of 4734, or 45% of conventional
(four-wall, closed-in) capacity. Of first-run capacity the figure is even higher. Wometco
appeared as amicus curiae contested vigorously, and lost. Gainesville acquisition, Hearing
Transcript, Feb. 25, 1965, (S.D.N.Y.), p. 29-36; Gainesville acquisition, Order (granting
petition), Feb. 26, 1965 (no competitive restrictions).
178. One of these areas is Clear Lake City, Texas, a NASA and aeronautical industry
site midway between Houston and Galveston (area population 78,000). The order was
granted from the bench. Gainesville acquisition, Hearing Transcript, mipra note 177, at
p. 8. There was only one other competitive theatre in the area, the Gulf-way Drive-In,
Id. p. 6. and the area had a projected population of 214,000 by 1970 and was thus a rather
significant exhibition market. Id. p. 4 .
The other competitive area was Chattanooga, Tennessee. The theatre was to have
800 seats and be constructed in the "moderately growing" suburbs of the city, past
Missionary Ridge. Id. p. 13. Petitioner then operated one of ten theatres in Chattanooga,
and one of the three first-run theatres. Thus, the acquisition gave it two of four first-run
houses, or 50% of the first-run market. It may be significant that a single circuit, Martin
Theatres. Inc., [140 theatres throughout the South, Fixu DA=Y YEnwo or Moron
Pzrc'uRns 1064 (1964)], owned the remaining nine theatres in town. Id. p. 14. Thus if
an oligopoly figure is used (adding the petitioner's market share to that of its major com-
petitor), as it was used in Wilkes-Barre, (see note 150 .stpra) the resulting figure would
be 100%. This case is totally inconsistent with the Wilkes-Barre opinion. The petition
was granted from the bench. Id. p. 20.
179. See notes 177 and 178, .iPrma
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cases admit of only one conclusion. By speaking of dominance in terms of per-
centages of seating capacity and number of theatres without attempting to
render the results consistent from case to case, the court has created the illusion
of a standard where none in fact exists.'80
V. PREVENTIVE ANTI-TRUST GONE ASTRAY: JUDICIAL PREVENTION
OF COMPETITION
Even were seating capacity and number of theatres reliable and consistent
indices of "dominance" in a market, the bounds of which were properly defined,
180. It would seem that there are other factors, such as dynamic population and com-
mercial growth in a given competitive area, which will render percentages of seating
capacity or of total theatres in operation otherwise illegal quite innocuous, or otherwise
permissible too great to be allowed. The difficulty is that the court has never bothered to
articulate its reasons for ignoring market percentages or factors which would otherwise
establish illegal dominance. This problem is complicated by the general paucity of opinions.
A very recent case, National General's petition to build a new conventional theatre
in a large shopping center in Canoga Park, California, totally conflicts with all prior
cases and illustrates the complete absence of any guidelines for the court and the parties,
Yet, the result seems correct under the standard suggested by this Comment. See text
following note 232 infra. In this case, the court allowed petitioner to build a theatre despite
the fact that the new facility would give National General six of 17 first-run conventional
houses in the relevant geographic market, the San Fernando Valley. In fact, the court
even conceded in its opinion "that the Government's claim that petitioner occupies a donil-
nant position is not ill-founded." United States v. Loew's, Inc. April 6, 1965, p, 8 (unre-
ported) (hereinafter cited as Canoga Park). Two opposing factors, however, outweighed
this concession; first, that the competitive area involved was undergoing rapid growth,
(it is 30 miles from downtown Los Angeles) and second, that there was a concurrent
increase in competitive moving picture theatres. Ibid. The court may have also relied on
the fact that petitioner's seven theatres (including one drive-in) would compete with
19 other theatres (including one drive-in) on first-run either part or full-time, id. at 6,
that petitioner's seating capacity since 1951 had fallen from 17% to 13% of the total
due to new construction, that multiple first-run showing was the distribution pattern, and
that there was within one and seven-tenths miles from the site a new 1400 seat Stanley
Warner theatre to offer strong competition. Id. at 2. If the last factor alone is considered,
the opinion is undoubtedly correct, since petitioner's next closest theatre was ten miles
away. Id. at 4. See text following note 232 infra. The Canoga Park case, however, resulted
in an order which took away what the opinion had given. At the instance of the Depart-
ment of Justice the court restricted National General's (NG) entire San Fernando Valley
operations. The Order, filed in the Southern District of New York on May 3, 1965
(unreported) prohibited NG's nine theatres, including the new one, from playing first run
in any calendar year the product of the seven major companies and Buena Vista for more
weeks than the present eight NG theatres in the area played first run in 1964. Provision
for judicial relief from the restriction was conditioned on a "substantial" change in
distribution patterns in the Valley or on a showing of "substantial" prejudice to the new
theatre's operations. National General did not consent and litigated to the finish. Despite
the highly restrictive order neutralizing the liberality of the opinion, the latter is signifi-
cant because it shows the "dominance" concept to be merely another factor like several
others, and illustrates the absence of any settled, predictable, approach to determining If
an acquisition will "unduly restrain competition." It is one of the court's best opinions,
nevertheless, because it articulates the court's reasons for permitting the acquisition despite
the presence of factors rendering similar petitions fatally defective.
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the concept itself should be discarded. The results in many cases, of which
Cheltenham, Hainden, and Wilkes-Barre are illustrative, have been highly
undesirable. Competitors not competition have been protected and trade has
been restrained. The court and the Department of Justice have gone astray
because the dominance concept emphasizes the strength and advantages of the
petitioning circuits, and limits the Department's and the court's inquiry to
whether the petitioners will dominate a local exhibition market, instead ot em-
phasizing the strength of existing competition in that market.
With the exception of the cases in which petitions have been granted with-
out restriction, it is difficult to find an instance in which the Justice Depart-
ment's and the court's approach to these petitions did not result in the insula-
tion of certain competitors from the rigors of competition. The role allowed
the amici curiae in these cases is a partial explanation of these results. During
the last half-century, the role of the amicus curiae has been enlarged, espe-
dally on the appellate level. The role now includes taking the side of one of
the litigants, commenting on the factual situation in the case, making dear the
implications and ramifications in the social, political or economic sphere of any
particular rule of law, and voicing an opinion as to the validity of the various
contentions raised by the parties in interest.' 8' But appearing in the trial court
and presenting evidence in the form of testimony or affidavits, for the purpose
of disproving or attacking the validity of a party's case has never been per-
mitted; this is the domain of the intervenor.' -82 While the court and the Justice
Department have verbally supported these traditional limitations and the pol-
icies behind them, their actions lead one to suspect the depth of their commit-
ment. The Justice Department often seems reluctant to take any position in
these cases before consulting with the amici t8 and the court has permitted
181. Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 Yx L.J.
694, 703-04 (1963). See generally, Krislov, supra, for the point that the amicus' role has
been expanded to permit broad class and group interests to be heard at the appellate
level, when a decision in a private suit will materially affect their welfare. The entire
rationale which supports this expanded role for the amicus at the appellate level is inap-
plicable at the trial level.
182. See 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5f 24.02-.05, 24.16 at 103-20 (2d ed. 1963). The
intervenor, precisely because he is a party in interest, is expected and permitted to in-
troduce evidence and contest that introduced by the other parties; and quite properly, if
the other parties do not meet and overcome the intervenor's case, they lose. In the
acquisition cases, the arnici have been permitted to introduce their own evidence, and
the petitioning circuits are expected to meet it; affidavits fly back and forth; sometimes the
testimony of amici is taken. In these respects, the amici are playing the role of inter-
venors.
183. The Stanley Warner Hamfden petition was typical. The Department consulted
at considerable length with counsel for the competing theatre owners, and the resulting
decree, text at notes 101-105 supra, was written during such consultations. Interviews
with Mr. Maurice Silverman, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division,
in Washington, D.C., June 15, 1964, and Mr. Monroe Stein, counsel for amicus Bailey, in
New York City, May 16, 1964. See also Mr. Silverman's report of his conference with
counsel for amicus Lincoln theatre concerning protecting it from the new theatre, Hamden
Hearing Transcript, supra note 93 at pp. 67-68.
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these same amici to introduce evidence of petitioner's anti-competitive prac-
tices and of the dire effects on their theatres should the petition be granted.184
Even worse, the court has considered this evidence, weighed it, and some-
times, finding it credible, has acted upon it.185 With the exception of the right
to subpoena documents and witnesses, to cross-examine, and to appeal, the
competing theatre owners have obtained the status of intervenors, sub nomiw
amid curiae. As a result each acquisition case in which amici are active has
become a private antitrust suit in miniature, often culminating in a decree
designed specifically to protect the protesting amici regardless of the effect on
competition in the market as a whole.18 6
It would be inaccurate and unjust to imply that the court is unaware of the
ever-present danger that the acquisitions clauses of the Paramount decrees will
become instruments for supplressing competition in the name of preserving
competitors. Rather the contrary is true:
In view of the very vigorous activity of the amicus curiae in this case,
I feel constrained to add that the consent decree was not intended to pro-
vide other exhibitors with immunity from competition. It is the public's
interest in free competition which is sought to be vindicated by the con-
sent decree.187
The primary responsibility for suppressing competition must be laid at the
door of the Justice Department, often the initiator, after conference with the
lawyers for the amici curiae, of the most blatant competitive restrictions. As
the court wrote in Cheltenham:
184. The Representative Cases described in part III, supra, provide illustrationi. See,
e.g., text accompanying notes 107-111 supra (Garden Grove); in the Poughkeepsie case
amci's assertions that American Broadcasting-Paramount controlled its divestee illegally
may have been decisive, see text, supra accompanying note 132. In National General's
San Jose, Calif. case, the court devoted two and a half pages of reported opinion to the
amici's contentions and evidence. See San Jose opinion 76374-76.
185." This seems to have been what happened in the Garden Grove case, since the
Government did not introduce evidence or otherwise oppose the acquisition. See text
accompanying note 107 supra. Certainly, the court gave the anlii's extensive evidence In
the San Jose case considerable weight.
186. The court's opinion in National General's Phoenix, Arizona acquisition, United
States v. Loew's, Inc. (National General), 1961 Trade Cas. 77675 (1961), is particularly
damning in this regard. Here the amid curiae barraged the court with evidence of peti-
tioner's anti-competitive practices and "unclean hands." See depositions of Mr. Bert Pirosli,
counsel for five owners of eight competing theatres, filed Jan. 28, 1961 in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, on file in Antitrust Division's Paramount Docket. The court's opinion
stated
After diligent examination of the relevant facts, the Division has found no merit
in the challenges raised by competing exhibitors. However, to protect the inde-
pendently operated drive-in theatres from any possible competitive disadvantage
with respect to the licensing of first-run product, the Division has suggested a
number of restrictions on National's operations which the petitioner has agreed
to accept. (Emphasis added).
United States v. Loew's, Inc., supra at 77676.
187. United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1960 Trade Cas. 77397, 77398
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Cheltenham).
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[T]he order which has been submitted to me by the Petitioner contains
a number of restrictions suggested by the Attorney General and which
the Petitioner has agreed to accept. These restrictions are designed spe-
cifically for the protection of the amid curiae. They are given protection
from key run competition which they would neither have nor be entitled
to if an exhibitor not subject to the decree were erecting the theatre. I
regard the restrictions as more than ample to protect the legitimate in-
terests of the amid curiae .... j88
Concededly, these restrictions did not meet the acid test of litigation, as they
rarely do in these proceedings; the circuits generally acquiesce, as in Clhlten-
ham, Hainden, and Fayetteville, out of fear of prolonging the litigation or
losing the support of the Justice Department.160
The court, however, does not itself have totally clean hands. In La Mirada,
it was the Justice Department and the petitioner in favor of wide open com-
petition, pitted against the amid, who naturally favored some sort of judicial
protection, and the court, which expressed its sympathetic attitude from the
bench during the hearing:
THE COURT ... but it strikes me that where an area is saturated with
movie theatre services, if indeed it is,... then it seems to me that...
the advent of a new, large, first-run theatre can possibly have disastrous
effects upon the already existing... situation to the point that it might
eliminate considerable competition, not stimulate it, not preserve it, and
it is that aspect of this petition which concerns me.
To give you an example which is perhaps ridiculous, but which points
up what I am trying to say in another area of business, there is a resort
colony not too far away from New York City on an island. Up until not
too long ago there were about six or seven independent green grocers
there, each one making a living of sorts. Suddenly, a supermarket chain
... decided to establish a supermarket right in the middle of the island.
The supermarket was established, and automatically all of the green
grocers went out of business, and they were all working as clerks in the
supermarket....
But that is what I mean. That is, of course, a different kind of business,
and the proportions are exaggerated, but this is what I am trying to say
when you refer to the fact that the advent of a large new business can
sometimes eliminate competition and not stimulate it.100
The Department of Justice had approved the construction at the hearing,
despite the fact that it might have resulted in the demise of a competitor, and
it was at that position that the court's fire was directed. After reflecting on the
court's attitude, Assistant Attorney General Loevinger, on behalf of the De-
partment, changed his mind and filed a memorandum approving the court's
analysis:
188. Ibid. See also the courts opinion excerpted in note 186 supra.
189. Interviews with counsel for the various petitioning circuits have developed this
reason, and the author is convinced that no other explanation can be adduced, since the
counsel interviewed were all strongly opposed to the restrictive decrees with which
their clients were saddled.
190. La Mirada Hearing Transcript, note 52 .upra, pp. 47-49.
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Heretofore, the Government has generally opposed these acquisitions
only where local domination by the acquiring circuit has been threatened.
However, we do not urge that this is the only proper test, and if the Court
believes that this acquisition will threaten the continued existence of one
or more of the competing independent theatres, we believe that it may
properly withhold its approval.' 9 '
Since Loevinger's resignation the Department has been backing away from this
position, although its retreat has not been complete. Whether the court has
itself tempered its concern for the survival of individual competitors is specu-
lative, since no acquisition case involving a degree of competitiveness similar
to that present in the La Mirada market has since arisen. But in any event,
whether tempered or full-blown, preoccupation with a competitor's fate at the
expense of the competitive process itself is indefensible.'9 2
The most damaging criticism lies in limine: if the "green grocer" of the ex-
hibition market is an efficient and aggressive competitor, he does not need
protection. That a theatre operator is "small," in terms of either the number
of theatres he owns or the size of his theatres, does not mean that he is at a
serious competitive disadvantage. On the contrary, these very factors may
make him a more formidable competitor. Because his theatre, usually 600-800
seats, and his managerial force are small, the small local exhibitor operates with
a lower overhead per theatre and thus can give the distributor a very high
percentage of box office gross and still make a significant profit. Numerous
examples are available; three, however, should suffice. In February, 1965,
Stanley Warner was permitted to build an 1100 seat conventional shopping
center theatre in Akron, Ohio. A Mr. Rabb, a small local operator who had
just built a 614 seat house about a half-mile from the shopping center site,
appeared as amicus curiae and objected at the hearing that the new theatre
would put him at a disadvantage in bidding for product.10 3 Both the court and
the Government supplied answers which not only rebutted this amicus, but also
undercut many of the court's earlier opinions:
191. La Mirada Post-Hearing Memorandum of the United States, p. 2, supra note 52.
192. [I]t is the essential mechanism of competition and its prime virtue that more
efficient firms take business away from the less efficient. Some businesses will
shrink and some will disappear. Competition is an evolutionary process. Evolution
requires the extinction of some species as well as the survival of others, The
business equivalents of the dodoes ... are in for a bad time - and they should be.
Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLum. L. Rav. 363, 375 (1965). The very
economic justification for competition - the maximization of consumer want satisfaction,
and thus the creation of greater wealth - is frustrated when competition is prevented
by private collusion or judicial fiat in order to preserve small, inefficient competitors.
Bork, supra note 165, at 831-32. Even Professors Bork and Bowman's severest critics,
Professors Blake and Jones of Columbia Law School, do not dispute this point. Indeed,
they write: "The idea that small business is entitled to protection simply because it is
small business is a corrosive force that has been a threat to antitrust from the beginning."
In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 377, 398 (1965).
193. Hearing Transcript, p. 13, United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. (Akron
acquisition), February 26, 1965, opinion and order unreported [hereinafter cited as Akron
acquisition].
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THE COURT: Sometimes the 1100-seat house has a harder time in their
bidding than small houses because of their tremendous overhead. It does
not always follow because of the greater number of seats the more advan-
tageous the bidding position is.194
MR. SILVERMAN (Justice Department): Now with respect to Mr.
Rabb's problem, the motion picture distributors are under an injunctive
obligation to give his theatre a competitive opportunity to license pictures
on first-run. Now, this means that if the Village is a suitable theatre,...
and I presume it is a modem theatre, the distributors would have to give
it the competitive opportunity I have been referring to.
With respect to the size of the theatre, it is true that sometimes a theatre
of 618 seats bidding with respect to a particular picture might be at a dis-
advantage. It is not entirely a disadvantage to be smaller, as your Honor
pointed out, since sometimes a smaller theatre can win a picture by virtue
of being able to offer the distributor a longer run than the larger theatre
can offer.... Also, sometimes.., overhead factors enter in the licensing
of a picture. For example, pictures are frequently licensed under so-called
90-10 bases, where the distributor and exhibitor agree on an overhead
figure, and then that comes off the top, and whatever is left goes 90 per
cent to the distributor and 10 per cent to the exhibitor. And sometimes,
and quite frequently, a smaller theatre which has a lower overhead has
a distinct advantage in endeavoring to license a picture of that sort. So
it is a combination, the smaller size is a combination of advantage and
disadvantage.'9 5
The smaller theatre operator's competitive advantage is not merely theoret-
ical. One of the most famous small theatre success stories in the industry is
that of the Arcadia Theatre, on 16th and Chestnut in Philadelphia. Arcadia,
owned by an operator independent of the major circuits, was on subsequent
run until 1950 when the Paramount decrees required theatre-by-theatre bid-
ding to be initiated. At that time the Arcadia's owner, a small crain operator,
bid 90-10 over his house overhead of about $2650 per week, and took some
of the finest first-run product from the Stanley Warner and Goldman circuits,
whose houses were Philadelphia's first-run palaces. Warmer's Mastbaum (4387
seats) and Stanley (2932 seats) respectively had overhead expenses four and
three times that of the Arcadia, and Warner's Stanton Theatre (1373 seats)
was twice as costly to operate as the Arcadia. Goldman's similarly large houses
were equally at a disadvantage. Today, the Arcadia is still one of Philadelphia's
leading first-run theatres.' 96 In Washington, D.C., a similar situation prevails.
There the Towne Theatre with 800 seats outbids the much larger Stanley
Warner, Loew's and RKO theatres. The operator of the Towne is very small,
194. Ibid.
195. Id. at 16-18.
196. All of the information in the text concerning the Arcadia Theatre was supplied
by Mr. Stuart Aarons, Office of the General Attorney, Stanley Warner Corp., telephone
interview, April 28, 1965, New York City. This information and that in the note following
is contained in abbreviated form in Mr. Aarons' letter of the same date to the Yale Law
Journml, on file in the Yale Law Library. For verification of the size of the Arcadia
Theatre, see Brief for Petitioner, Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Filn Distributing
Corp., supra note 131.
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owning only three theatres, two of them neighborhood houses. Nevertheless,
by offering 90-10 over a small house expense, he has been able to obtain for
the Towne Theatre, on first run, such pictures as "To Kill a Mockingbird,"
"Charade," "Irma La Douce" and "A Shot in the Dark," all of them among the
leading box office attractions of 1963-64.197 The small competitor, then, if he
is efficient and if he operates an attractive modem facility, is not at all com-
parable to the local "green grocer" who could not hope to compete with the
supermarket chain. Indeed, the small exhibitor can and does give the national
chain exhibitor a competitive licking in many bidding situations. The inefficient
small operator, with out-of-date and unattractive facilities is another matter.
Protecting him is indefensible; merely to state the proposition should be enough
to destroy it.198
Regardless of whether the small exhibitor actually needs the court's protec-
tion, and considering only the philosophy of an approach which seeks such a
result, it becomes apparent that this approach to antitrust enforcement repre-
sents a choice of policy in search of a rationale. The commandment of the
acquisition clauses requires the court to keep competition from being "unduly
restrained." There can be no justification for assuming that this clause requires
that the competition be between small corporate units rather than large ones.
Genuine competition between large theatre chains can be as beneficial to the
public and to the economy, if not more so, than competition between smaller
units. The fact that the wave of modem theatre building sweeping the country
was initiated, and is now being led, by the larger local, regional, and national
circuits is convincing testimony to the validity of this proposition. Unless the
size of a firm approaches the legal or economic bounds of monopoly, or unless
it has been used in a predatory manner, size alone is no offense to the antitrust
laws.199
The La Mirada case, where the court made its remarkable "green grocer"
speech, moreover, did not involve the purchase of a smaller competitor; it
was a clear case of internal expansion by construction of a new facility. This
type of industrial growth, above all others, has always been favored by the
antitrust laws. Even in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,00 the case often
criticized as the Supreme Court's most anti-competitive venture, internal ex-
pansion was singled out by the court for approval:
Internal expansion is more likely to be the result of increased demand for
the company's products and is more likely to provide increased investment
197. Letter from Mr. Stuart Aarons to the Yale Law Journal, spra note 196, con-
tains all the data given in the text. If a quality film is defined as one earning over $1 mil-
lion at the box office, see note 209 infra, then each of the films listed is of superior quality:
"To Kill a Mockingbird" ($7,200,000), "Charade" ($6,150,000), "A Shot in the Dark"
($6,500,000) Variety, Jan. 6, 1965, p. 39 .
198. See note 192 jupra.
199. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932); United States v. Unlted
States Steel Corp, 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
200. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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in plants, mbre jobs and greater output. Conversely, expansion through
merger is more likely to reduce available consumer choice while providing
no increase in industry capacity, jobs or output.2 0
If the new plants or facilities drive less modem, less efficient, or competitively
inferior plants and facilities out of business, this should be approved, if not
favored and encouraged, for it is the very essence of healthy competition. z2
Any attempt to protect smaller inefficient competitors must result in an eco-
nomic cost to society.
Stanley Warner's Hamden, Connecticut, acquisition provides an excellent
example of the values at stake. Here, Stanley Warner sought to construct a
facility better able to serve the movie-going public of the Greater New Haven
area than any existing theatre. It would be the only theatre in town with totally
adequate parking facilities at its doorstep; the only one capable of exhibiting
every one of the most modem wide-screen processes; and the only one engi-
neered to fully utilize the maximum potential of the new accoustical technology.
The amici curiae, whose holdings included the oldest houses in the area, quite
naturally made every effort to convince the court that the New Haven theatre
market did not need an additional facility, and complained bitterly that if con-
struction were permitted they would be driven out of business. The court re-
jected these arguments to the extent that it granted the petition; yet it severely
restricted the competitive ability of the new theatre, rendering it a subsequent-
run house. In so doing, the benefits which competition traditionally brings
were interdicted, and consumer choice was frustrated at an overall economic
cost to society. °
201. Id. at 345 n. 72.
202. See note 192 supra.
203. Because the new theatre was judicially restricted in its ability to show first-run
product, the consumer had to forego the better parking facilities, the advantages of seeing
the latest widescreen technology, and the pleasures of the latest stereophonic and acous-
tical developments offered to him by the new theatre, (see note 165 .upra and accompany-
ing text) in order to see the first-run product when he preferred to do so. This repre-
sents a cost to consumers and to the economy as a whole. In another context, one authority
writing that the economic cost to consumers of permitting cartels to exist can be the
same as permitting merchants to collusively agree to close up shop on Sundays, makes
this same point in another way:
Consumers who lose the convenience of shopping on Sunday are deprived of some-
thing that is as much an economic good as is $50. There is no acceptable vray for
a judge to decide that a restriction [i.e., a cartel] in the offering of a convenience is
any less objectionable than a restriction in the number of automobiles sold.
Bork, supra note 165 at 835. The court's and justice Department's attempt to stifle com-
petition at the consumer's expense had much in common with amicus Bailey's attempt
to prevent the construction of a new theatre in Greater New Haven altogether. Bailey
sued in the circuit courts of the State of Connecticut, to prevent the construction of the
new theatre. The theory of this suit was that the erection of a theatre in the Hamden
Shopping Center would violate the zoning laws of that community, and, therefore, that
the public interest demanded that such construction be prevented. He lost. See Whitney
Theatre Co. v. Zoning Bd., 150 Conn. 285 (1963).
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The harmful effects on competition which have resulted from many of the
acquisition cases are particularly unfortunate in light of the historic purpose
of the Paramount decrees. In Paramount, the Department of Justice success-
fully sued the eight leading motion picture companies of which five, the majors,
were vertically integrated with exhibition circuits. One primary purpose of the
suit was to eliminate the monopoly in first-run exhibition obtained by these
circuits in many towns throughout the country. The economic theory on which
this branch of the case proceeded was that
[T]he pooling of the purchasing power of an entire circuit in bidding for
films is a misuse of monopoly power insofar as it combines the theatres
in closed towns with competitive situations.2°4
The catch-phrase was "transfer of monopoly power." The objective was to
break this monopoly power by forcing divestiture of at least one theatre in each
"closed" or monopolized town.205 The acquisition clause was then written
into each decree, requiring judicial approval of the purchase or construction
204. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 334 U.S. 131, 154-55 (1948).
205. This branch of the Paramount case proceeded on theories of predatory practices,
transfer of monopoly power, "deep pocket" bidding and other exclusionary practices con-
ventionally considered monopoly-gaining devices, and as such illegal per se, Stated inI
its pristine form the theory which governed the exhibition branch of the Paramontt case
and justified the forced divestitures of theatres and the acquisitions clauses appears in
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948):
A man with a monopoly of theatres in any one town commands the entrance for
all films into that area. If he uses that strategic position to acquire exclusive privi-
leges in a city where he has competitors, he is employing his monopoly power as
a trade weapon . . . . It may be a feeble . . . weapon where lie has only one
closed or monopoly town. But as those towns increase in number throughout a
region, his monopoly power in them may be used with crushing effect on coinpet-
itors in other places .... Though he makes no threat to withhold the business of
his closed . . . towns unless the distributors give him the exclusive rights in the
towns where he has competitors, the effect is likely to be the same where tie
two are joined. When the buying power of the entire circuit is used to negotiate
films for his competitive as well as his closed towns, he is using monopoly power
to expand his empire.
Id. at 107-08. Accord, Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116
(1948).
This whole theory of injury to competitors, with its component parts including exclu-
sionary practices and price-cutting, has come under heavy fire as unfounded in economics,
and thus, as erroneous in law. See Director and Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Re0'mula-
lion, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 281 (1956) ; McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Stalard Oil
(NJ.) Case, 1 J. L. & EcoNoMIcs 137 (1958); Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65
CoLum. L. Rzv. 363, 366-68, 402 (1965).
This Comment, however, accepts the economic postulates of the Paramount ease, as
previously developed in Griffith and Schine, as fait accompli. They are the theories gov-
erning antitrust lav in the motion picture industry, and the decrees rest solidly upon
them. Indeed, however dubious the economic and legal basis of Paramount, this topic lies
well outside the scope of the present endeavor. For these reasons, all analysis and con-
clusions which follow proceed from the theory of Paramount and only make sense when
viewed from within its confines.
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of any further theatres by the defendant circuit for the specific purpose of
assuring that no defendant circuit would ever again "dose," or monopolize, a
town. As abundantly illustrated by the Representative Cases, this purpose has
been lost in the shuffle. Only once in the numerous acquisitions cases did it
ever come to the surface. In this case,20 Stanley Warner's petition to buy the
Lone Star circuit comprising 37 theatres in Texas, the Justice Department
attacked the purchase not on the grounds that it would cause an "undue re-
straint" of competition in any local market, but rather on the ground that a
circuit should not be allowed to merge with another circuit because of the
dangers of "circuit buying power" and large size. This line of attack forced
the court to meet the issue of what the Paramount acquisitions clauses were
designed to do; and what it said in that case should have provided a guide for
the disposition of all previous and subsequent petitions, although, as the record
indicates, it has not.
There is no doubt that the Paramount Decree and its satellite consent
judgments were intended to stamp out the evil of monopoly and the stifling
of competition through the misuse of buying power. . . .But the target
was the misuse of circuit buying power, not a naked financial potential.
The root of the evil consisted of the dosed towns which the operators
could use as a bargaining device to obtain favorable treatment in com-
petitive areas. That was the basic reason for the compulsory divestitures
which put an end to the closed towns. At the hearing upon the submission
of the Paramount Consent Judgment on March 3, 1949, for Court ap-
proval, the representative of the [Government] ... Mr. Robert L. Wright,
stated that the decree dealt with "the problem of opening up closed towns,
rather than in terms of size. The aim here has been to see that this cir-
cuit does have opposition at all critical points so that there are alternative
outlets in all locations where it operates, and that in our view is a far
more effective means of dealing with the problem of circuit buying than to
say in some decree, provide a form of dealing and negotiating licenses."20T
Against the background of the history of the Paramount case, this statement
by the court and the explanation of the decrees offered by the Government's
attorney who, in effect, wrote them, provides the key to the errors made in
the Representative Cases. What the court has done in Cheltenham, Hamden
and Fayetteville, for example, is determine if any competitor is in danger of
being eliminated or competitively disadvantaged by an acquisition. If so, the
court denies the petition or restricts it. The focus is on the fate of specific com-
petitors, rather than on the general market conditions and the economic status
of all competitors - the considerations which would determine the likelihood
of a town's being "dosed."
The Department of justice and the amici curiae have, in part, justified their
blatant disregard for the overall competitive milieu of the specific market in-
volved and the anticompetitive provisions in the petition orders - the restric-
tions upon the four circuits' ability to compete freely - by asserting that it is
206. United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 77074 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (hereinafter referred to as the Lone Star Circuit opinion).
207. Id. at 77075-76.
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not competitive inefficiency which would destroy existing competitors, but the
scarcity of film product available for exhibition. Thus, in Cheltenham it was
agreed that no more than 79 pictures released in 1958 and 81 released in 1959
could be regarded as "quality pictures or pictures with box office signifi-
cance" ;208 this was allegedly too little product to keep more than three key
run theatres alive in that market.20 9 This shortage provided the basis for the
Government's demand for restriction on Stanley Warner's overall competitive
potential: "The Government agrees that there is a shortage of quality pic-
tures.... It is for this very reason that it has asked that certain restrictions
be placed on Stanley Warner."210 The assumption is that the acquisition clause
of the Paramount decrees would be violated if Stanley Warner's new and com-
petitively superior facility drove certain competitors out of business, irrespec-
tive of whether, even with their demise, the market remained sufficiently com-
petitive. And the correlative assumption must be that the Sherman Act is a
directive to the courts to prevent one competitor from extinguishing another.
These assumptions are erroneous, even if there is a shortage of product such
that only a certain number of theatres can survive in a given market. Prevent-
ing or restricting the construction or operation of new, more attractive and
efficient, theatres 2 11 in order to preserve existing less desirable facilities repre-
sents a misallocation of the economy's resources which should not be encour-
aged by judicial fiat.21 2 Preserving existing facilities at the expense of newer
ones locks investment into theatres which the movie-going public considers
relatively less desirable. The net effect is to place artificial obstacles in the way
of what would otherwise be the natural movement of capital into an area where
it might obtain a high return. Ultimately such restrictions on free competition
208. Post-Hearing Memorandum of the Government in the Cheltenham case, supra
note 87, p. 8.
209. The Department raised the same argument in National General's recent Canoga
Park, California, petition, supra note 180. But instead of accepting it, as in Chelnihants,
the court rejected it.
In this highly competitive industry, where success and failure frequently turn on
the vagaries of public taste, first-run moving pictures often establish their "quality"
status only through a 20120 hindsight appraisal. The evidence adduced at the hear-
ing was not sufficient to permit this Court to draw the inference that first-run
product should by definition be so limited [Government argued that "quality"
product was "post-television quality" or films with minimum domestic box office
gross of $1 million] and that consequently it is in such short supply that none
is available for an additional theatre.
Canoga Park opinion, p. 7.
210. Government's Post-Hearing Memorandum in the Cheltenham Case, 4tPra note
87, p. 7.
211. Of course, in the context of the shortage of product argument, only petitions
to build new theatres are considered, since they alone add additional screens to their
respective competitive situations. Petitions to acquire pre-existing facilities add no addi-
tional film-buyers, andthus could not materially affect the supply of product for existing
competitors.
212. See authorities cited in notes 165, 192 iupra.
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prevent the creation of wealth because they deny consumer want satisfaction.'1
Viewing the inability of existing theatres to survive the advent of new com-
petition in terms of shortage of product, moreover, overlooks the probability
that the decline in the number of films produced annually since the early 1950's
is a function of the marked decline in the number of people willing to go to
the movies.214 The pronounced shrinkage in the patron market has already
forced the closing of numerous theatres throughout the nation. It may be, how-
ever, that many local exhibition markets still contain more theatres than are
warranted by the number of available patrons. If this is indeed the case, con-
tinued contraction should be expected. Many local exhibition markets may be
unable to support more than one, or at most two, theatres. The antitrust laws,
however, are not violated by a circuit's struggling to be one of the surviving
theatre operators, as long as it wages its competition fairly. "In other words,
a natural monopoly market does not of itself impose restrictions on one who
actively but fairly, competes for it, any more than it does on one who passively
acquires it."! 25 Rather, the antitrust laws favor wide open competition, because
it may make a significant difference which of the many competitors struggling
for survival wins:
An interesting speculation might be whether the antitrust laws were in-
tended to protect one natural monopolist against another... Since these
213. This argument is, of course, a tautology, wealth being itself conventionally defined
as the satisfaction of consumer wants; to create wealth is to maximize consumer satis-
faction. See Boric, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Dis'ion, 74 YALE IJ. 775, 829-839 passim (1965). The irony in the court's anticompeti-
tive enforcement of the antitrust laws is that the main tradition of these laws has always
been a pro-consumer policy. Ibid.
214. Although there were undoubtedly other factors contributing to the decline in
film production, the data would support the view expressed in the text. The full impact
of television was felt in the mid-1950's and now keeps millions at home.
YEARS 1940 1944 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962
Films
Released By:
Major
Distributors 375 272 253 265 275 226 237 236 193 155
Minor
Distributors: 98 137 153 160 78 70 72 95 46 45
Total: 43 409 406 42 53 29 30 31 29 20
The 1964 figures are Major Distributors 150; Minor Distributors 54; total: 204 releases.
Data from Theatre Owners of America, Inc., 1501 Broadway, New York 36, N.Y.
YEARS 1940 1944 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962
Weekly Attend-
ance at U.S.
theatres [est.
in millions]: 80.0 85.0 90.0 60.0 51.4 49.2 46.5 39.6 40.4 42.5
Data from Fius DAImy YEABooK oF MORION PicruREs 115 (1964).
215. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d SA2 584
(1st Cir. 1960).
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laws are concerned primarily with the public interest,... it may be that
they would not be involved if, for instance, the product provided by either
party would be the same. However, we cannot say that it would not be in
the public interest to have one newspaper [or theatre] rather than an-
other. Where there is no identify of performance we will not say that the
public does not have an interest in competition even though that com-
petition be an elimination bout.216
In the exhibition market, where the facilities, location, and film-licensing policy
of a theatre are significant to the theatre-going public, it certainly does make
a difference which of two or more competitors wins the struggle for survival.
For these reasons, it is erroneous to say that the antitrust laws compel the
court to restrict one competitor as the Government and the amici curiae main-
tain is proper; rather, regardless of whether product is short or the patron
market is shrinking, the public's interest would require that all available prod-
uct be exhibited by those theatres best able to maximize consumer satisfaction.
This point of view seems especially appropriate where, as in all acquisition
cases to date, no one has assumed that all competitors will be eliminated and
a monopoly will result.
VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE ACQUISITIONS CLAUSES:
A RETURN TO COMPETITION
This comment has considered in great detail a most important and unusual
experiment in preventive antitrust. To date this experiment must be considered
a disappointment. The Paramount decrees, originally designed to foster and
stimulate competition in an industry previously shot through with anticom-
petitive restraints, have themselves become instruments, for the restraint of
trade. The court, encouraged, if not led, by the Justice Department has en-
grafted on the "unduly restrain competition" standard the dominance concept.
This concept, by focusing on a petitioner's size and ability to make business
less profitable for one or more competitors, rather than on the viability of com-
petition itself, has ineluctably led the court and the Department to the protec-
tion of those competitors. The exaggerated and extraordinary role permitted
the amici curiae is symptomatic of this preoccupation with competitors. The
criteria used to determine dominance, moreover, are founded on fuzzy market
definitions and on the utilization of economically and legally unreliable factors,
such as seating capacity and number of theatres.
This unhappy performance must force a return to the origins and raison
d'etre of the acquisitions clauses. As already developed, the historic purpose of
the Paramount decrees was to root out the evil "of the dosed towns which the
operators could use as a bargaining device to obtain favorable treatment in
the competitive areas."217 This was accomplished by the divestiture clause
which made certain that the circuits "have opposition at all critical points so
that there are alternative outlets in all locations where [they] operate..."218
216. Id. at 584 n. 4.
217. The Lone Star Circuit opinion, 77075.
218. Ibid.
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In addition, the decree contained distribution clauses which required that prod-
uct be offered and purchased on a film-by-film, theatre-by-theatre basis, ren-
dering circuit buying and transfer of monopoly power impossible.210 The ac-
quisitions clauses were designed as additional mechanisms for implementing
this purpose; the District Court was assigned the responsibility of seeing that
the defendant circuits by making acquisitions would not monopolize numerous
exhibition markets once again.
Although the acquisitions clauses may have been thought desirable in 1949
when the Paramount decrees were written and their effectiveness was at best
speculative, the acknowledged efficacy of the distribution and divestiture clauses
and the striking transformation of the exhibition industry during the last 15
years has rendered the acquisitions clauses unnecessary. The District Court
itself has emphasized the unprecedented success of the Paramount decrees.
The ills found to have existed in the moving picture industry were eradi-
cated with an effectiveness, precision and finality unique in antitrust liti-
gation. The penalties have been exacted and paid.
There is... no basis for any apprehension that the condemned practices
of mass purchasing are about to be revived. 20
The competitive changes wrought by the decrees have been matched and
hastened by the growth in size and proliferation in number of dynamic local,
regional, and national circuits. Today, many of these circuits possess the access
to capital, the quality of management, and the efficiencies of scale to enter
freely any competitive area in the country.ml The distribution clauses, more-
over, assure that having entered a specific market, the given circuit must re-
ceive treatment equal, in terms of access to product run and clearance, to that
received by existing competitors with equivalent facilities. A final goad to
competition is the demise of the horizontal cartel among the exhibitor defend-
ants which had existed prior to the Paramount litigation.2- In this posture,
219. See the provisions of the decrees, supra note 171.
220. The Lone Star Circuit opinion, 77076.
221. The local and regional circuits, of course, are somewhat more limited, but they,
too, are expanding significantly and should continue to do so. The Vometco Circuit, for
example, is the strongest in Greater Miami, and thus in South Florida. Its expansion,
however, has not been limited to its home territory. Within several months, when its
new theatre is completed in Gainesville, Florida, 360 miles north of Iiami, Wometco
will be American Broadcasting-Paramount's strongest competitor in that local market.
See note 177 supra. Other major national, regional, and local circuits of great competitive
significance are listed in note 225 infra.
222. One of the most important by-products of this decartelization of the enxhibition
market is the movement of each of the four active spin-off circuits into each other's
territory. See, e.g., the Loew's Miami acquisitions, discussed in notes 44-51 supra, and
accompanying text. [Loew's moved into an area traditionally the territory of American
Broadcasting-Paramount (Florida State Circuit)]; the Stanley Warner La Mirada
acquisition, discussed in notes 52-63 supra, and accompanying text (Stanley Warner here
invaded National General's territory). The National General Canoga Park case gives
evidence of another Stanley Warner invasion of National General's territory. Here
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it is highly unlikely that any one circuit could close a substantial exhibition
market for any significant period of time.223 Even should an occasional geo-
graphic market be dosed, the injunctions requiring that film product be offered
theatre-by-theatre would prevent the transfer of the monopoly power so ob-
tained to competitive situations. But, more important, the Department of
Justice and any local theatre owner or distributor injured by the circuit's
obtaining a monoply possess sufficient statutory weapons to remedy this un-
likely situation - for example, section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7
of the Clayton Act. In any event, the acquisitions clauses today are a haphazard
and discriminatory device for preserving competition in all competitive areas,
as their onus falls only on four 2 of perhaps several dozen circuits with equal
potential and incentive to monopolize a local market.225 Given the peculiar
Stanley Warner had already built a new theatre 1.4 miles from National's proposed site,
which would give National's new theatre severe competition for every picture to be shown
in their local, multiple-run submarket. Note 180 supra.
223. In this regard, the ubiquitous presence of General Drive-in or Smith Manage-
ment Corp., the predecessors of General Cinema Corp., in Stanley Warner's Chellenhat
and La Mirada cases is very significant. General Cinema now operates 74 drive-ins and
shopping center theatres and is building 31 more. See Annual Report for 1964, General
Cinema Corp., Feb. 19, 1965. In Cheltenham, (see text at note 78 supra) and in La Mirada,
(see text at note 62 supra). General Cinema was prepared to build on Stanley Warner's
proposed sites, if the court refused to grant the Stanley Warner petitions.
224. RKO Theatres, Inc., the fifth spin-off circuit has, at least until this year, not
been acquiring new theatre properties. See note 7 mtpra. Thus there are only four circuits
against which the consent decrees continue to run, and to which the acquisition clauses
therefore apply: Stanley Warner, approximately 207 theatres; American Broadcasting-
Paramount Theatres, Inc., approximately 413 theatres; Loew's Theatres, Inc., approxi-
mately 56 theatres; and National General Corp., approximately 225 theatres. They control,
with RKO, roughly 955 of the nation's 13,750 four-wall and drive-in theatres. The data
concerning circuit holdings have been obtained from papers submitted by the five spin-off
circuits to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice on May 24, 1965. The
figure on total theatres in operation will appear in the forthcoming FILm DAiLY YEAniooit
oF MonoN PicruRas for 1965.
225. In terms of naked financial potential, the leading national circuits, unaffiliated
ith the five spin-off circuits, are: General Cinema Corp., 105 theatres (see note 223,
uipra); and United Artists Theatre Circuit, 271 theatres, Fmr D aL YnEAuooi ov Mo-
ioNr PicTuREs 1078-80 (1964), which is composed of Rowley United Theatres, 96, United
California Theatres, 72, Metropolitan Playhouses, 83, and United Artists Circuit, 20. Id.
at 1072, 1080, 1079.
The leading regional circuits are Martin Theatres, 140 theatres (southern states);
Brandt theatres, 116 (Conn., N.Y.C., N.J. and upstate N.Y.); Commonwealth theatres,
117 (midwest); Prudential New York theatres, 81 (Conn. N.J., N.Y.-Westchester, N.Y.-
Long Island); Gulf States Theatres, Inc., 65 (gulf states); Frontier Theatres, Inc., 85
(Tex. N.M.); Central States, 68 (Iowa, Neb.); Schine Circuit, 61 (N.Y., Ohio, Iy.,
Del., Md.); Stewart & Everett, 55 (N. Car., S. Car.). Id. at 1064, 1044, 1047, 1070, 1080,
1057, 1055, 1046, 1073, 1076.
Examples of successful local circuits are: Butterfield Theatres, 63 (Michigan);
Pacific Drive-in, 60 theatres (California); Floyd Theatres, 39 (north Fla.); Jefferson
Amusement Co., 39 (Texas); Skouras Theatres, 53 (N.Y. and N.J.); Walter-Reado-
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effectiveness of the decrees, 26 and the highly competitive structure of today's
national exhibition industry, it is exceedingly difficult to justify the continued
existence of the acquisitions clauses. For this reason, the District Court should
exercise its continuing jurisdiction to strike - - 7 these clauses from the Para-
wount decrees. The national exhibition market having been made competitive,
the only function of the antitrust laws has been served and the District Court's
responsibility has been fulfilled. There is no reason not to allow this com-
petitive market to regulate itself.
Sterling, 41 (N.Y., N.J.); Wometco Theatres, 34 (Fla., Bahamas). Id., at 1045, 1063,
1053, 1060, 1074, 1081, 1083.
A score of other regional and national circuits could be listed. These circuits all
possess the same incentive to attempt to "close" or monopolize the local exhibition
market as do the big four spin-off circuits: the permanent elimination of competitive
bidding; stronger negotiating positions for sharing advertising expenses Nith distrib-
utors, obtaining adjustments of rentals when bids turn out to be excessive, and getting
better play dates; and the prevention of disadvantageous day-and-dating of conventional
and drive-in-houses. Many of these circuits have been successful in monopolizing various
local exhibition markets - or, at least, so successful that they have been vulnerable to
suit on grounds of monopolization. Two examples, are the Attorney General of Havii's
suit against Royal Theatres, Ltd., and Consolidated Amusement, two companies con-
trolled by William Foreman, who controls Pacific Drive-in, and the Attorney General
of Washington's suit against Sterling theatres and "an army of affiliates" (Sterling itself
controls 32 theatres, mostly in Washington) id. at 1076. The former ended in a consent
decree wherein Foreman gave up his 51% control of Royal, and the latter is still in
litigation, although the Washington Attorney General has lost the first round. See id. at 81.
226. See text, supra note 220. Even Conant mixes criticism of the decrees with
the grudging concession that they radically changed the industry's structure, practices
and conditions. CoNAwT, 208-10, 218-19. However, this concession is limited by Co-
nant's fears of the "circuit buying power" and "monopoly power" of the spin-off cir-
cuits; ibid. Yet, his book can be read carefully from cover to cover without the reader's
ever discovering a definition for this mysterious "power," or even so much as an illus-
tration. Nor does Conant offer any theory of how this "power" operates in the market
place. In view of the provisions of the decrees requiring theatre-by-theatre licensing of
all films, this fear is irrational. It is something else again to argue that the decrees
are not being enforced; if so, then the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade
Commission have been derelict in their duties. Continued enforcement of the acquisitions
clauses is not likely to solve this kind of a problem.
227. The court could act on the motion of one of the parties in an acquisition pro-
ceeding, or it could act sua sponte within the broad scope of its equity powers.
228. It is, of course, only a "shorthand" way of speaking to say that the purpose of
the antitrust laws is to preserve or promote competition. Taken literally, it is inaccurate.
The goal is maximization of consumer want satisfaction, see Bork, supra note 213 at 829,
830, 831-39, passim, for which a competitive market place in all goods and services
is essential. But certainly, if there is some dispute over the ultimate goal of antitrust
law, ie., whether it may be stated at all in economic terms, see, e.g., Blake and Jones,
supra note 165, there can be no argument about the purpose of the acquisitions clauses
or the court's role under them; it is economic: to preserve competition (the word itself
is used, see text accompanying note 10 supra) in all exhibition markets in order to prevent
transfer of monopoly power.
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One major obstacle to striking the acquisition clauses may be the well estab-
lished judicial aversion to modifying consent decrees absent the most compell-
ing circumstances. The most forceful statement of this attitude was made by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Swift & Co. 229
We are asking ourselves whether anything has happened that will justify
us now in changing a decree... the inquiry for us is whether the changes
are so important that dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated
to a shadow. No doubt the defendants will be better off if the injunction
is relaxed, but they are not suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected
as to justify us in saying that they are the victims of oppression. Nothing
less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of liti-
gation with the consent of all concerned.
230
An additional consideration militating against elimination of the acquisitions
clauses might lie in the maxim that an "ounce of prevention is worth a pound
of cure." Thus, the Justice Department might argue that it would be impossible
to continually investigate the exhibition industry in order to detect and eradi-
cate local or regional exhibition monopolies created by the spin-off circuits
through construction or purchase of existing theatres. Despite the remoteness
of this possibility, 2a ' the spectre it creates may very well persuade the District
Court to retain the acquisitions clauses in the decrees.
If the acquisitions clauses are retained, they should be reinterpreted to ren-
der them consistent with the purposes of the Paramount decrees and to elimi-
nate their current anticompetitive application. Such a re-interpretation must
begin with the fundamental reason why the defendant circuits were forced to
divest theatres in their "closed towns" and were enjoined from acquiring ad-
ditional facilities in any market without judicial approval: to insure that the
circuits "have opposition at all critical points so that there are alternative out-
lets in all locations where [they] operate .... ,232 It follows from this objective
that the "unduly restrain competition" standard requires the court, in passing
on the purchase or construction of a new theatre, to determine whether that
theatre will face at least one competitor capable of depriving it of top quality
product in a bidding situation, whether or not bidding is in fact the mode of
distribution in that market.
This suggested test involves several considerations. Because profitability in
the patron market is so largely dependent upon success in purchasing product
to exhibit, the court would first have to determine whether, in the subjective
judgment of a hypothetical film distributor, an outlet alternative to the acquired
theatre in fact exists. Since distributors allocate product according to their sub-
229. 286 U.s. 106 (1932).
230. Id. at 119.
231. It presumes that the spin-off circuits, the notorious culprits of the inlustry,
having been once badly burned, will again go near the fire.
232. Quotation from argument of Mr. Robert L. Wright, chief Government counsel
who authored the Paramount decrees, before the 3-judge court in 1949, cited by the
court in its Lone Star Circuit opinion, discussed in text accompanying note 207 .rnpra.
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jective evaluation of the bounds of the geographic market, and since the sug-
gested test looks to whether the acquired theatre will lose product to an existing
competitor in the same geographic market, the court should accept, without
further inquiry, the market as defined by a majority of the major distributors.
This will eliminate the uncertainty inherent in present arbitrary market defini-
tions. For the same reasons, the court should look to the competitive qualities
to which a distributor looks in evaluating a bid. It is only in this respect that
seating capacity should be considered relevant as one of several factors includ-
ing location of theatre, modernity of equipment, parking facilities, overall con-
dition of the theatre and its appointments, and general policy of the manage-
ment as to length of run, road shows, and willingness to compete for expensive
product.
In those cases where the court is uncertain of the existence of a competitor
whose presence will keep the petitioning circuit from monopolizing the market,
the inquiry must go on. As the present wave of theatre building demonstrates,
the local exhibition markets are not static. It is therefore incumbent upon the
court, in judging the existence of competitive alternatives in cases involving
new acquisitions, to assess the possibility that present competitors will mod-
ernize, build new facilities, or change their management policies to meet the
new competition. Moreover, as the acquisitions cases themselves indicate, new
entry into local markets is easily accomplished.2-- For these reasons, the court
should look to the identity of the pre-existing theatre operators. If a strong
local, regional or national circuit is presently operating a theatre which will
be rendered competitively inferior by a petitioner's acquisition, it is likely that
this competitor would modernize its existing theatre, or if this were imprac-
tical, would build a new one to preserve or recapture its market share. Excel-
lent illustration is provided by Stanley Warner's Cheltenham acquisition, which
was motivated by the competitive inferiority of its Yorktown Theatre relative
233. In terms of the economics of entry, any given local motion picture exhibition
market illustrates the archtype of easy entry, especially for firms established in other
local markets - whether geographically contiguous or remote. Bain gives three conditions
for easy entry, all of which are met in motion picture exhibition:
(1) Established firms have no absolute cost advantages over potential entrant
firms;
(2) Established firms have no product differentiation advantages over potential
entrant firms;
(3) Economies of large-scale firms are negligible.
BAmN, BA 2ERS TO NEW CoPTmITION 12 (1956). Only (3) may appear dubious; but all
experienced operators in the industry will testify to the disadvantages facing the large
circuits due to the costs of supporting large management and bookkeeping staffs. Under
the theatre-by-theatre clause of the decrees, any operator, no matter how small, may
obtain product if he is willing to pay for it; often the smaller theatre operator with
lower overhead can afford to pay the distributors more. If it be asserted that the circuits
have "deep pockets" and will bid from a long pocketbook, this is something else again,
and such an assumption brings the argument away from the economics of entry to the
area of predatory practices - a distinctly different problem, and itself an area of much
dispute. See note 205 supra.
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to the Ellis Circuit's Erlen Theatre.234 Similarly, the court should be influenced
by the potential entry of other chains operating in nearby local markets. In fact,
both types of situations - the re-entry of an existing competing circuit and the
new entry of a circuit competing nearby - are very likely to occur, because
both types of circuits already possess experienced local management and local
connections with the distribution exchanges located in the territory.
Since the test offered above depends upon the competitiveness of the market
as a whole - whether or not the theatre to be purchased or constructed would
lose product in a bidding or negotiating situation to any of its competitors -
it is relevant to consider the competitive milieu of the market. This milieu
may be characterized by either predatory practices or the splitting of product
among competing theatre owners. While both these practices may be labeled
"anti-competitive" in the language of the court and the parties, they have very
different implications for the test proposed above.
Evidence regarding past and present predatory practices, such as agreements
between the petitioning circuit and the distributors concerning discriminatory
runs and clearances, may indicate a likelihood of the continuance of such "pre-
dation ' 2 after the acquisition with the purpose and effect of monopolizing the
market. Here the competing theatre owners should be encouraged to inform
the Department of Justice of the existence of such anti-competitive or predatory
practices. Only the Department, as representative of the public interest, should
be permitted to introduce this evidence in an acquisition proceeding. Presum-
ably the Antitrust Division will have made an independent judgment as to the
probative value of this evidence before introducing it. And the court should
consider this evidence relevant only if convinced that it has a direct bearing
on the probable viability of competition after the acquisition. This procedure
differs from present practice because it would bar the amici curiae from intro-
ducing any evidence concerning anticompetitive practices. This limitation on
the amici would have the salutary effect of expediting the proceedings, of re-
moving arguments irrelevant in the context of the particular case, and of elimi-
nating a source of concern for the protection of individual competitors.
Although splitting of product 23 6 has never been determinative in the denial
of a petition, the Poughkeepsie and Fayetteville cases are representative of
several others where the court considered splits as a factor in its decision. The
existence of a split, however, should be considered relevant only in an extreme-
ly limited sense.
A split has been defined by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,237 as "in essence an
234. See text supra at note 72.
235. The entire theory of "predation" is itself open to serious question. See note 205
supra. Nevertheless, it is an integral part of the mythology of motion picture antitrust law,
and is accepted here for purposes of discussion.
236. See earlier discussion and examples supra in notes 70, 92, and accompanying text,
237. 320 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1953) aff'd by an equally divided court, 378 U.S. 123 (1964).
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agreement between exhibitors to divide product and to refrain from bidding
against each other for pictures on their respective sides of a prepared lisL"t.' s
In practice this amounts to taking a group of pictures on the release schedules
of one or more distributors and dividing the pictures, assuming two theatre
circuits, into two equal lists. The one who did not arrange the lists has the right
to the first choice of lists. The next group of films will be split into two lists by
the other party, and again the one who did not do the arranging will have the
first choice. Another common type of split operates along distributor lines, each
participating theatre being assigned the product of one or more distributors
which it plays exclusively. The analysis which follows assumes the existence of
one of these two basic kinds of splits, but does not in any way proceed from
premises or conclusions concerning the legality of this form of market division
under the antitrust laws. 9 Whether such elimination of competition between
competing theatre operators is considered illegal per se or defensible under the
rule of reason, is irrelevant for the purposes of correctly applying the acquisi-
tions clauses of the Paranunt decrees. The presence of a splitting device is
relevant only to the extent that it reflects the underlying economic structure
of the local market.
A split may either be imposed by the competing theatre owners upon the
distributors, who generally acquiesce, or by the distributors themselves. Al-
though a number of reasons have been put forth to explain this phenomenon,
in general, an exhibitor-imposed market division proceeds from the desire to
eliminate competitive bidding. The elimination of competitive bidding from a
market of relatively equal competitors usually results in each competitor ob-
taining the same quality product he would have received through bidding, but
at a considerably lower cost. It has always been unclear why distributors ac-
quiesce in division of their product, but whatever the explanation, it is un-
important. What is significant for the purpose of applying the suggested test
to any proposed acquisition is that the split originated with the exhibitors and
continues to exist. For such a split proves that the local market has a competi-
tive structure; absent the split, competition would exist in that market. If one
theatre were competitively superior to another, it would presumably refuse to
eschew competition and divide the market, as the Ellis Circuit's Erlen refused
to split with Stanley Warner's inferior Yorktown." ° If in the rare case the
split is distributor imposed and higher returns are deliberately foregone, ex-
planation is more difficult. Three reasons have most often been adduced. A dis-
tributor may impose a split in order to avoid litigation over his reception of
bids and award of licenses. Or he may divide his product so as to insure a full
"play-off" of all of it, especially his low quality films probably unable to receive
238. 320 F2d at 292 n. 7.
239. See note 135 supra for general discussion of the factors affecting the legality of a
given split.
240. See text supra at note 72.
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an exhibition in a competitive market.24' The third reason proffered is the
distributor's desire to keep as many outlets as possible alive to avoid monop-
sony in the product market. As is immediately apparent, the first two reasons
would testify to a healthy competitive situation in the absence of a split. If
there is constant controversy in a bidding situation, it must indicate that the
competing theatre owners think that their bids are comparable and that they
are equally deserving of the distributor's product. In those cases where a dis-
tributor imposes a split in order to assure a full play-off, competition must
exist among the exhibitors, otherwise the low quality films could be placed in
those first-run houses unable to compete for better quality product. The third
reason alone - the fear of monopsony - would indicate visible imperfection
in the competitive structure. But even this would be of dubious validity in
assessing competitive conditions for purposes of realizing the goals of the Para-
mount decrees; for the imperfections may not be so significant that the newly
constructed or purchased theatre would not face at least one competitor capable
of depriving it of quality product. Since most of the explanations of splitting
indicate a viable competitive structure in the area absent the split, and since it
is difficult to determine whether a split is distributor or exhibitor imposed, and
if distributor imposed, the reasons, the presumption should be that the existence
of a split indicates a highly competitive market structure with the Govern-
ment 22 bearing the burden of establishing the contrary. Regardless of whether
the Government carries its burden, the existence of a split should be considered
only one of several factors in the court's ultimate decision; the court should
also look to the possibility of entry or re-entry in determining whether the new
theatre is likely to face competition in the local market.
The factual determinations necessary to make a finding that the theatre to
be purchased or built will face at least one competitor capable of depriving it
of top quality product in a bidding situation are not nearly as difficult as they
may appear.2 3 First, the court must define the relevant geographic market as
241. So motivated, a split is very similar to a non-contractual form of block-booking
or vertical integration, and accomplishes the same purpose for all parties concerned.
242. It is always open for the amici to furnish the Government with evidence to
prove the origin and effects of any given split.
243. For example, in the La Mirada case, the existence of the new Vinnicof theatre,
and the new Stein and ElectroVision theatres, see text at note 60 upra, going up near
La Mirada, should have ended the inquiry. Similarly, once the strong competitive chal-
lenge of amicus Ellis' Erlen Theatre was established, see text, supra at notes 71-75, the
Cheltenhzam case should have been closed. Likewise in Gardent Grove, Wilkes-Barre and
Fayetteville I, where strong competitors were all very much in being. In the more diffi-
cult cases such as Hainden, where the new theatre would be superior to all the rest, the
court should have looked to new entry and to the probable re-entry of established firms.
Moreover, the smaller, less modern Whalley was still a formidable competitor because
of its low overhead and ability to offer bids as or more attractive than Stanley Warner's
new theatre, see note 233 supra.
The burden of proof is on the petitioner due to the wording of the decrees, see text
supra note 10. But, in all fairness, it should only be a burden of persuasion; the burden
of coming forward with evidence to prove an acquisition wrill "unduly restrain trade"
[Vol. 74 :10411110
MOTION PICTURE ANTI-TRUST
delineated by the distributors in terms of competitive zoning. In most cases
this delineation will be readily apparent from the run and clearance pattern in
the area; if question arises, testimony can be taken in depositions or affidavits
from the distributors. Second, the court must look to the competitive qualities
of the theatres which will compete with the acquisition as the distributor would
look at them in awarding licenses. Expert testimony as to the relative qualities
of the various theatres can easily be supplied by the parties. Moreover, evidence
as to the paid admissions of each theatre during a given period can easily be
obtained by subpoena,2" in order to show the performance of all competitors
vis-a-vis each other prior to the acquisition. In this manner, a hierarchy of
competitors in the area can be assembled, and the leading competitor(s) de-
termined. Third, so far as new entry or re-entry is concerned, the requisite
finding can be simplified merely by greater emphasis on the corporate identity
of the circuit, local, regional or national, to which the local competitors belong.
If they are dynamic and well-financed, competitive alternatives to the acquisi-
tion are made likely, if not immediately, at least ultimately. Fourth, since the
Justice Department is responsible for initial determination of the probative
value of the evidence submitted by amid as to predatory practices and their
continuance, the court's difficulties in this area should be reduced. Although
difficulties of proof may still inhere in the suggested test, this of course does
not warrant its rejection if it is more justified in law and economics than that
presently in use.ns 5
The motion picture industry has been peculiarly wracked by antitrust liti-
gation. The response of the courts to these suits has produced far-reaching
changes in the industry's organization and practices. Throughout the onslaught
of complaints, trials, decrees and petitions under those decrees, the overriding
objective of the federal judiciary has been the restoration and preservation ol
competition on all levels of the industry. The administration of the acquisitions
clauses, however, has unwittingly worked at cross-purposes with this goal.
should be on the Government. The Justice Department should be required to prove that
no nearby competitor is capable of depriving a petitioner of product, or that petitioner
has violated the antitrust laws in that local market. The petitioner should not be required
to prove the negative ab initio. The costs of subpoena, discovery, and other investigation
needed to support this Comment's suggested test should thus fall, to a large degree, upon
the Government.
244. Such evidence was easily obtained in the Cheltenham case, see note 174 supra.
There is no reason why it cannot be similarly obtained in other cases. Whether or not it is
reliable is something else again. Exhibitors are notoriously inaccurate on these figures,
although the larger chains are generally reliable. In any case, sworn affidavits, with
concommitant threat of perjury indictment for wilful fraud, should be required.
245. Having criticized the court and the Department of Justice for the content they
have poured into the acquisitions clauses of the respective Paramount decree% and
having advanced a new approach to these clauses, application of this approach to specific
factual situations would undoubtedly be desirable. But since the court and the parties
have proceeded upon a theory different from that suggested by this Comment, the requisite
evidence for such an exercise is very largely missing from the available source materials.
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The objective of this Comment in recounting the court's and the Department
of Justice's disappointing performance in enforcing these clauses has not been
to justify a counsel of despair. Rather, this Comment has attempted to re-
assess the standards by which the clauses are to be administered, so as to con-
form them to the philosophy of the Paramount litigation and of the antitrust
laws in general - the maintenance of an economy which functions and regu-
lates itself through competition in the marketplace.
